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Abstract 
Anthropogenic climate change is a formidable global challenge. Yet countries’ contribu-
tions to global greenhouse gas emissions and the climate change impacts they face are 
poles apart. These differences, as well as countries’ different capacities and development 
levels, have been internationally acknowledged by including the notion of Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) and Respective Capabilities under the 1992 Unit-
ed Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
The logic of CBDR was paramount in enabling negotiators to agree on an international 
legal framework for climate policy in the 1990s. Quite paradoxically, however, it has 
since proved to be a major obstacle in negotiating a universal new climate agreement, now 
envisioned for 2015 under the UNFCCC’s “Durban Platform”. The UNFCCC’s original 
dichotomous differentiation between “Annex I” parties (basically comprising “industrial-
ised countries”) and “Non-Annex I” parties (i.e. developing countries) reflects neither sci-
entific knowledge nor current political realities. The system of international climate policy 
has thus become dysfunctional. In fact, mitigation efforts by industrialised countries alone 
would be insufficient to avoid dangerous climate change, even if they were far more ambi-
tious than they currently are. The diversification of state groups and country coalitions 
among developing countries, and the rise of emerging economies such as China and India 
– now among the world’s major greenhouse gas emitters – warrant a critical reconsidera-
tion of the conceptualisation and implementation of CBDR. Yet, no progress has been 
made so far to adequately adjust for the UNFCCC’s principled anachronism. 
It is against this background that this DIE Discussion Paper presents a state-of-the-art re-
view of the notion of CBDR in international negotiations. It thus aims to identify mecha-
nisms that could contribute to reinvigorating CBDR as a meaningful guiding principle for 
a 2015 climate agreement under the UNFCCC. To this end, it first considers the normative 
framing of CBDR and reviews the way CBDR has been conceptualised and interpreted in 
the academic literature. Second, it scrutinises the way CBDR manifests itself under the 
UNFCCC and how it explains the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy before it summarises 
the respective political standpoints of some of the UNFCCC’s most important and influen-
tial parties (or groups of states). Third, it provides an analysis of the way CBDR or 
CBDR-like approaches have been put into practice in a variety of international regimes 
and policy arenas, including the World Trade Organization, the Montreal Protocol and the 
burgeoning debate on universal Sustainable Development Goals. The discussion paper 
thus brings forward different approaches for the attribution of emissions, criteria and 
means that allow for a differentiation of responsibilities for the reduction and limitation of 
emissions, as well as for mechanisms that facilitate broad participation in the conceptuali-
sation and implementation of CBDR. It concludes that a flexible implementation of CBDR 
is needed to take into account the multiplication of country coalitions among developing 
countries and the rise of emerging economies. Finally, we argue for a flexible regime that 
would include differentiation of state groups beyond the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichoto-
my, with graduation and exclusion mechanisms that are based on a set of transparent, 
measurable and verifiable indicators of development, emissions and capacities.  
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A note to the reader 
This discussion paper addresses policy-makers and stakeholders in the public policy dis-
course on climate change as much as it engages with the more academic debates on com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities in a changing world of states. It follows a simple and 
straightforward structure that is deliberately composed of loose building blocks that may be 
read separately as well as in sequence. We hope this will allow for quick reading and easy 
reference. Following the introduction, chapter 2 describes the normative origins and concep-
tual framing of CBDR. Chapter 3 captures the evolution of CBDR under the UNFCCC, as 
well as the political positions of individual parties (or groups of parties). Chapter 4 reviews 
alternative manifestations of CBDR in other international regimes and contexts. Lastly, 
chapter 5 synthesises the insights of this discussion paper. Although most chapters and sub-
sections can be read independently, many cross-references and a set of summarising tables 
highlight the contextual inter-linkages that provide for a bigger picture. 
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1 Introduction 
“All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others.” 
(George Orwell, Animal Farm) 
The notion of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities 
(CBDR-RC) is a cardinal notion in the context of international negotiations under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In the complex 
conundrum of international climate change negotiations, CBDR-RC reflects a lasting po-
litical consensus that the widest possible cooperation by all countries is needed to combat 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof, and that, second, all have a responsibility 
to act accordingly. However, the word “differentiated” also implies the adoption and im-
plementation of differing commitments for different states while taking into account their 
diverse circumstances and capacities, their historical contributions to CO2 emissions and 
their specific development needs (cf. Honkonen 2009). 
Paradoxically, the logic of common but different responsibilities (CBDR)1 enabled negotia-
tors to agree on a legal framework for international climate policy in the 1990s, yet proved a 
considerable obstacle to negotiating an adjusted treaty for the post-2012 period. Indeed, 
CBDR has been a recurrent issue in recent negotiations on both the pre-2020 ambitions and 
the 2015 global agreement, as envisioned under the UNFCCC’s “Durban Platform”. Negoti-
ators have to find equitable ways to keep global warming below 2°C, with finance and tech-
nology transfer being parts of the deal (e.g. CAN 2013a; BASIC Experts 2011). 
To put CBDR into practice under the UNFCCC, responsibilities of parties were initially 
differentiated on a dichotomous basis that distinguished “Annex I” parties (member states 
in 1992 belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) plus additional states undergoing the process of transition to a market economy) 
from “Non-Annex I” parties. In essence, this dichotomy reflects the economic welfare of 
countries – measured in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita – in the immediate wake 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some 20 years after the climate convention was 
agreed upon, most developing countries still want CBDR to maintain a clear differentia-
tion between different categories of states. They do have a point. All 65 nations whose 
emissions paths currently seem to be within the climate-friendly range are poor develop-
ing countries (WBGU 2009). From their perspective, forfeiting CBDR would be tanta-
mount to compromising their “right to development” (e.g. Kartha / Athanasiou / Baer 
2012, 48). This notwithstanding, developed countries – and the United States in particular 
– object to CBDR as a legally binding principle and have instead pleaded for increased 
uniformity in parties’ obligations (Deleuil 2012; Harris / Symons 2013). 
In any case, the multiplication and diversification of state groups and country coalitions 
within the broad group of developing countries, and especially the rise of emerging econ-
                                                            
1  “Common but differentiated responsibilities” is the general principle that scholars and policy-makers 
usually refer to, and it represents how the notion was first mentioned as a principle in the Rio Declara-
tion in 1992 (see section 2.1). In the UNFCCC, it was stretched to include respective capabilities 
(hence CBDR-RC) and, although included in the convention’s “principles” section, was explicitly not 
included as a legal principle. In this report, we therefore refer to the notion of CBDR (without RC), un-
less otherwise stated. See also Box 1 and sections 2.1 and 3.1. 
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omies – with China and India now being among the world’s major greenhouse gas emit-
ters – has called the validity of the initial reading of CBDR into question: the Annex 1 / 
Non-Annex 1 dichotomy hardly reflects current greenhouse gas (GHG) emission realities. 
As Parikh and Baruah (2012) show, the emissions of Non-Annex 1 countries increased by 
223 per cent between 1990 and 2008, while the already high emissions of Annex I coun-
tries have roughly remained the same. However, ever since the UNFCCC was adopted in 
1992, no progress has been made to better account for the dynamic diversification of de-
veloping countries (Deleuil 2012; Parikh / Baruah 2012; WBGU 2010). The North-South 
politics that fall together with the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy have since been 
called “dysfunctional” and “the regime’s greatest weakness” (Depledge / Yamin 2009, 
443). Some have even suggested that any truly global negotiation is bound to fail “without 
a firm, effective and mutually acceptable bedrock definition defining the scope and depth 
of developing country involvement” (Walsh et al. 2011, 269). Clearly, the context and ex-
tent of this “developing country involvement” is politically contested, and not just among 
states. As Climate Action Network frames it: “the need for a dynamic approach to CBDR 
does not mean that the existing Annexes should be dissolved, but it does mean that they’re 
not the way forward” (CAN 2013a). 
Any move forward is complicated by the persistent vagueness and uncertainties of CBDR 
in the realm of international law. Accordingly, the core content of the CBDR principle as 
well as the nature of the obligation it entails remain deeply contested and exacerbate diffi-
culties in the ongoing post-2012 negotiation process (Rajamani 2010; Deleuil 2012). 
In this context of a changing world, the need to drastically cut global GHG emissions (see 
e.g. IPCC 2013), and given the urgent need for the international community to come to 
terms with an ambitious international climate agreement in time for the UN climate sum-
mit in Paris in 2015, this discussion paper explores potential clarifications and uses of 
CBDR in international climate negotiations. It reviews the definitions of CBDR and their 
meaning in international negotiations, identifies mechanisms to incorporate differentiated 
responsibilities in international agreements and tries to open up a debate that looks beyond 
the existing dichotomy between Annex I and Non-Annex I countries. In doing so, it inevi-
tably focuses on mitigation. This notwithstanding, the authors acknowledge that adapta-
tion as well as the burgeoning issue of “Loss and Damage” are increasingly important and 
reflected as such at the UN climate negotiations. Indeed, they are manifest responses to 
the inadequacy of current mitigation efforts. 
Against this background, chapter 2 discusses the normative framing of CBDR and reviews 
the way CBDR is conceptualised and interpreted in the academic literature, notably in 
international relations and international law. Chapter 3 then scrutinises the way common 
but differentiated responsibilities manifests itself under the UNFCCC, and provides a list 
of mechanisms that were proposed by parties, non-governmental stakeholders and aca-
demics to put CBDR into practice. It furthermore explains the dichotomy between Annex 
I and Non-Annex I parties in the light of parties’ economic development and historical 
emissions. Finally, it summarises the corresponding political standpoints of some of the 
most important and influential parties to the UNFCCC, based on their specific socio-
economic circumstances and emission pathways. Chapter 4 continues with an analysis of 
CBDR or CBDR-like approaches in a variety of international regimes, including those 
relating to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Convention to Com-
bat Desertification (UNCCD) and the Montreal Protocol. Although this cursory exercise 
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does not provide a rigid comparative analysis, it does provide a number of cues regarding 
the similarities and differences in the interpretation of “differentiated responsibilities” that 
co-exist in the international realm. Finally, chapter 5 concludes with an overview of the 
types of mechanisms that could be applied to differentiate responsibilities in mitigating 
climate change in spite of the prevalent North-South fault line.  
2 Normative framing 
This chapter describes the normative perspectives on CBDR in the international relations 
and international (environmental) law literature. It starts with a section on the origins of 
CBDR and how the principle became established in international law, followed by an ex-
planation of its underlying principles of fairness and equity. 
2.1 Origins of CBDR 
The notion of CBDR results “from the application of equity in general international law” 
(Sands et al. 2012, 233). CBDR can be seen as one means to formally integrate environ-
ment and development at the international level, and as a way to make one country’s 
commitments more “just” relative to the commitments of other countries – more propor-
tional in other words (Honkonen 2009). 
Elements of the CBDR logic can be traced back as far as to calls for a New International 
Economic Order in the 1970s, the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm and the 1979 Enabling Clause2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) (e.g. Rajamani 2006; Honkonen 2009). Yet, CBDR only evolved as an official 
international principle during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), where it was originally spelt out in Principle 7 of that summit’s 
Rio Declaration (see Box 1). The principle gained particular prominence in the context of 
negotiations on international climate policy, but is also relevant for other conflicts of in-
terest along the North-South fault line of international politics (see also Deleuil 2012; Har-
ris / Symons 2013). 
Prior to the groundbreaking Earth Summit and, indeed, the UNFCCC, international envi-
ronmental law was largely guided by principles that run counter to CBDR, namely 
through a strong emphasis on sovereign equality and reciprocity between states (Stalley 
2013). As with international environmental law, international environmental policy and 
corresponding negotiation processes basically built on the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. 
Its Principle 21 warrants “states sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies” albeit with the caveat “to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (UNCHE 1972; see also Handl 2012; 
Sands et al. 2012). 
                                                            
2  The Enabling Clause, officially called the “Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries”, was adopted under GATT in 1979. It 
enables developed country members to give differential and more favourable treatment to developing 
countries. 
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Box 1: The principle of common but differentiated responsibility in international law 
According to Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, the principle of CBDR is defined as follows (UNCED 
1992): 
States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health 
and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development 
in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command. 
Similar language was eventually codified into international law in Article 3.1 of the UN (1992a), which 
had been negotiated in the run-up to the UNCED, and was subsequently adopted there. Accordingly: 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of hu-
mankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibili-
ties and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 
Regarding the UNFCCC’s general principles, CBDR was thus expanded to include “respective capabilities”. 
However, the convention’s section on commitments (i.e. Article 4) does not refer to CBDR, but to “specific 
national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances,” which widens the room for 
interpretation. The UNFCCC’s 1997 Kyoto Protocol, in turn, prominently reiterates the UNFCCC text under 
“commitments” when it mentions CBDR as well as specific national and regional development priorities, 
objectives and circumstances (Article 10) (see also Sands et al. 2012; Kellersmann 2000). 
An emergent CBDR logic became apparent, for instance, in negotiations under the Vi-
enna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which has since proved to be a 
role model for the notion of a framework convention. Negotiations under the Vienna 
Convention sought internationally binding regulation regarding the emission of ozone-
depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which resulted in the 1987 Montreal Protocol. 
Although it does not introduce CBDR as such, it is quite explicit regarding the need to 
differentiate responsibilities according to capabilities by highlighting “the circumstances 
and particular requirements of developing countries” in its preamble and by relating 
parties’ “general obligations” to “the means at their disposal and their capabilities” 
(UNEP 2003 [Vienna Convention, Art. 2.2]). The Montreal Protocol accordingly pro-
vides for a number of mechanisms to include a differentiation of responsibilities, such as 
delayed compliance for developing countries and a special fund to facilitate implementa-
tion (UNEP 2003, see also section 4). 
CBDR formally evolved as an international principle during the 1992 UNCED in Rio de 
Janeiro, and is spelt out in Principle 7 of that summit’s Rio Declaration (see Box 1). In 
essence, it recognises the special needs of developing countries, especially in the context 
of international environmental law. As such, it comprises two core conceptual elements. 
The first element concerns states’ common responsibility for environmental protection at 
the national, regional and global levels. The second conceptual element concerns the need 
to take account of differing circumstances, especially in relation to each state’s contribu-
tion to the creation of a particular environmental problem and its ability to prevent, reduce 
and control the threat of it (Sands et al. 2012). 
Politically, the formal establishment of CBDR was ultimately the result of decades of po-
litical action and negotiating efforts by developing countries, with China exerting strong 
leadership (Stalley 2013; see also Biermann 1998). Arguably, inclusion in the UNFCCC is 
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its most prominent manifestation. The regime revolving around the UNFCCC has since 
been shaped by two distinct framings, again building on the Montreal Protocol and the 
UNCED. First, climate change was framed as an environmental issue, to which pollution 
control is the answer. Second, climate change was linked to the emergent paradigm of 
sustainable development, thereby highlighting intra- and intergenerational equity and em-
phasising the minor contribution of developing countries to current global environmental 
problems, their limited capacities to deal with them and the prevalence of poverty reduc-
tion as their political priority (Depledge / Yamin 2009). Consequently, CBDR-RC was 
included in the UNFCCC’s preamble as follows: 
[T]he global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all 
countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international re-
sponse, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and re-
spective capabilities and their social and economic conditions. 
Although this review does not exclusively relate to climate change mitigation, CBDR-RC 
is typically – and often implicitly – related to mitigation (Ciplet / Roberts / Khan 2013). 
For Annex I parties, an explicit emphasis on adaptation is prohibitive, as it would be con-
sidered tantamount to acknowledging responsibility for historical emissions and, hence, 
liability for corresponding adaptation needs. Indeed, decisions under the UNFCCC show a 
tendency to circumvent the issue of historical responsibilities: whereas the Rio Declaration 
clearly refers to historical contributions of developed countries to environmental degrada-
tion, a corresponding mention in the UNFCCC’s preamble remains the only formal refer-
ence in the context of the UNFCCC.3 
Article 3.1 itself is skewed towards mitigation as it states that “Parties should protect the 
climate system […] in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities” and that developed country parties should “take the lead in 
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof” (UN 1992a, Art. 3.1), even as 
“adverse effects” point to the need for adaptation, too. 
In recognition of the subtleties of international law, it is also noteworthy that Article 3.1 
does not refer to CBDR as a legal principle in the narrow sense, even though Article 3 is 
titled “Principles” (see Box 1; see also Bodansky 1993). As far as international legal 
scholars are concerned, the article title and the subsequent list of “principles” it entails are 
thus merely contextualising the convention for the reader. In other words, they are not 
intended to be obliging in the sense of legal principles (see Honkonen 2009). 
This is of particular interest when it comes to the negotiations under the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). The ADP was established 
during the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties (COP) 17 in Durban in 2011, and negoti-
ators under the ADP have been tasked (1) to develop a new legal instrument under the 
convention that is applicable to all parties by 2015 and will come into effect in 2020; and 
(2) to close the pre-2020 gap in mitigation ambitions. So far, the CBDR principle as such 
is mentioned neither in the ADP’s mandate nor its decisions, although it is acknowledged 
that the work of the ADP shall be guided by the principles of the convention. 
                                                            
3  See section 3.2 for more background information on historical emissions. 
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Deleuil’s (2012) analysis suggests that the practice of interpreting CBDR is actually chang-
ing: while negotiators keep mentioning Article 3 occasionally, they are now seen as com-
monly referring to more general notions such as equity, national circumstances and specific 
needs of developing countries. However, Deleuil also argues that clarification of the future 
place and meaning of CBDR should help to clarify state categories and the corresponding 
attribution of state obligations. This should, in turn, facilitate compliance and review proce-
dures in the respective treaty bodies and for all parties concerned (Deleuil 2012). 
2.2 CBDR’s underlying concepts of fairness and equity 
Ultimately, CBDR is meant to represent the philosophical notions of fairness and equity in 
international (climate) policy. Both of these meta-principles have similar philosophical 
connotations and are often used interchangeably in political discourse, notably at the inter-
national level and specifically where divergent interests between “North” and “South” are 
at stake.4 
Dellink et al. (2009) accordingly explain CBDR as a policy principle that is derived from 
equity and fairness as two general overarching concepts (see Figure 1). They highlight two 
tracks that lead towards CBDR. For the purposes of this discussion paper, we consider 
these tracks to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
First, on the basis of the ethical principle of consequentialism (i.e. justice as based on out-
comes of behaviour and decisions), polluters have a responsibility to act. This type of re-
sponsibility is part and parcel of many international treaties and expressed through a num-
ber of widely accepted policy principles such as: 
• No harm principle: the sovereignty of states does not include a right to harm other 
states; 
• Polluter pays principle: the polluter bears the costs of achieving acceptable 
environmental quality, thereby avoiding harm; 
• Precautionary principle: the obligation to avoid irreversible harm to others, even in 
the absence of scientific certainty about the potential harm. 
Second, a non-consequentialist logic of action suggests that the moral quality of a given 
act – that is, whether it is “right” or “wrong” – derives from the act itself, not from its 
eventual consequences. The precautionary principle, for instance, epitomises a non-
consequentialist position to the extent that a proof of harm (i.e. the consequence of an act) 
is not required to warrant actions taken to avoid potential harm or to abstain from the po-
tentially harmful act altogether. 
 
                                                            
4  This is not to say that equity and fairness would be considered synonymous in international climate 
negotiations. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “equity” as “the quality of being fair and 
impartial” and “fairness”, that is, the noun corresponding with the adjective “fair”, as “treating people 
equally without favouritism or discrimination.” For a concise philosophical excursion on equity in the 
context of CBDR, see Rajamani (2006, 150ff.). 
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Figure 1: General principles of fairness translated into policy principles 
 
Source:  Dellink et al. (2009) 
Taking their argument further, Dellink et al. (2009) translate the ethical principle of non-
consequentialism into a principle of “capacity to pay”. This essentially mirrors the “and 
respective capabilities” supplement, which was added to the original CBDR principle in 
order to put responsibilities and capabilities on equal footing. Politically, this reflects de-
veloped countries’ strong opposition to any reference to their historical emissions, which 
would, in turn, invoke a strong emphasis on the consequentialist “polluter pays principle” 
(see section 3.2 and Deleuil 2012). At the same time, it underscores that all countries share 
the responsibility to adhere to universal principles (such as the precautionary principle), 
even if they are poor and lack commensurate capacities. 
The logic of a “capacity to pay” effectively acknowledges that richer countries should pay 
more to combat climate change based on a normative principle of solidarity, irrespective 
of whether there is evidence that they have directly or indirectly caused harm. However, it 
also implies a cost ceiling, as no country should bear unacceptably high costs (Dellink et 
al. 2009). This caveat has the potential to gain political importance in view of the current 
global financial crisis, which has affected the financial capacities of a number of devel-
oped countries in particular. This is bound to further strain negotiations under the UN-
FCCC, as the definition of what is deemed unacceptable is evidently political. Indeed, 
developing countries might conversely argue that no country should emit unacceptably 
high amounts of greenhouse gases. 
In any case, proponents of a “single hybrid policy principle” (Dellink et al. 2009) of 
CBDR-RC make a strong case to balance consequentialist and non-consequentialist 
positions. Accordingly, the proposed principle would bring together responsibilities for 
climate-related harm on the one hand, and the capacity to fight climate change on the other 
hand (necessarily including the capacity to pay for corresponding efforts). Stalley (2013) 
in turn suggests that, in climate change negotiations specifically and international 
environmental politics more broadly, the achievement of justice has technically come to 
be defined as compliance with the CBDR principle. According to this reading, CBDR has 
developed over time as an answer to developing country parties’ calls for fairer rules and 
procedures in international environmental cooperation. Bringing it to bear in a new 
climate treaty would then be quintessential to achieving the universal agreement it 
requires to be effective. 
Equity / Fairness
CBDR-RC 
assessment
Responsibility
Non-consequentialismConsequentialism
Meta-principles
Ethical principles
Political principles
Policy principle
Capacity to pay
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3 CBDR and the UNFCCC 
Bringing together 195 parties, the UNFCCC today has a universal scope and constitutes 
the main international legal instrument on climate change. This regime has been shaped by 
two distinct framings, which can easily be related to the Montreal Protocol and the 
UNCED. First, climate change under the convention is framed as an environmental issue, 
where pollution control is the answer. Although it was recognised that there was no quick 
technological fix in sight for the climate problem – as there was with ozone – this prece-
dent and its Montreal Protocol inevitably influenced the emerging political dynamics of 
climate change and its regime design (Depledge / Yamin 2009). Second, the issue of cli-
mate change was integrally linked to sustainable development, highlighting intra- and in-
tergenerational equity, emphasising that developing countries are minor contributors to 
current global environmental problems, have lower capacities and still have high levels of 
poverty that need to be addressed first (Depledge / Yamin 2009). 
3.1 From principle to practice: CBDR and the mitigation of climate change 
Under these framings of climate change as an environmental problem and its link to sus-
tainable development, the principle of CBDR, expressed as common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities in Article 3.1 (see Box 1), helped to make uni-
versality possible among 195 parties. 
Although neither the preamble nor Article 3.1 of the convention text (see section 2.1) refer 
to mitigation in particular, the CBDR principle is mostly being discussed in relation to the 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions (Ciplet / Roberts / Khan 2013). Yet the principle 
of equity is indirectly included in agreements on climate finance, for example by the 
agreement that climate finance from Annex I countries for adaptation “will be prioritized 
for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small 
island developing States and Africa” (UNFCCC 2010, dec. 2/CP.15). And according to 
CAN, financial and technological support is key to reach an equitable agreement (CAN 
2013a). However, Ciplet, Roberts and Khan (2013) conclude that, in practice, adaptation 
finance has thus far reflected developed country interests far more than the principles of 
justice adopted by parties, particularly because of “ever-widening chasm between funds 
needed, and those promised and delivered” (Ciplet / Roberts / Khan 2013, 64). 
There are a number of important differences in the way CBDR is expressed in Article 3.1 
of the UNFCCC, as compared to the Rio Declaration. Whereas the Rio Declaration clearly 
refers to historical contributions of developed countries to environmental degradation, 
these contributions are only mentioned in the UNFCCC’s preamble.5 Related to this, the 
UNFCCC wording adds the notion of “respective capabilities” to CBDR. As developed 
countries strongly opposed any reference to their historical emissions, it was important to 
put responsibilities and capabilities on an equal footing (Deleuil 2012). Finally, the Rio 
Convention states that “developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear 
in the international pursuit of sustainable development,” which is fundamentally different 
from the UNFCCC statement that “developed country Parties should take the lead.” The 
latter is more active, but also implies that developing country parties can also take the 
lead, or will in any case follow (eventually). 
                                                            
5  See section 3.2 for more background information on historical emissions. 
Different perspectives on differentiated responsibilities 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 9 
Problem 
Some 20 years after the UNFCCC convention text was formulated, the vagueness and un-
certainties that have characterised the legal nature of CBDR remain unchanged, and its 
content and the nature of the obligation it entails are deeply contested (Rajamani 2010; 
Deleuil 2012).  
The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (which entered into force in 2005) reinforced the clear divide 
between Annex I (generally the developed countries) and Non-Annex I parties (the devel-
oping countries). Most of the Annex I parties to the convention agreed on legally binding 
targets to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, as listed under Annex B in the 
Kyoto Protocol. Non-Annex I parties also ratified the protocol, but it does not include 
binding targets for them to limit or reduce their emissions. In practice, this means that 
emissions of developing countries are allowed to grow in accordance with their develop-
ment needs. Furthermore, although Article 3.1 mentions the “lead” of Annex I countries, 
neither the convention nor the protocol explicitly state that Non-Annex I countries should 
follow this lead – should it be demonstrated (Depledge / Yamin 2009). Article 10 of the 
Kyoto Protocol does mention that all parties shall “continue to advance the implementa-
tion” of the commitments under Article 4.1 of the FCCC,6 but also explicitly states “with-
out introducing any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I.” Altogether, 
the “common obligations” in the UNFCCC of Non-Annex I parties are therefore some-
times criticised as being nominal (see Honkonen 2009, 131). 
In the future, however, not only the industrialised countries, but also the newly industrialis-
ing and developing countries have to limit the amount of greenhouse gases they emit in or-
der to prevent dangerous climate change (WBGU 2009). While the already high emissions 
from Annex I countries have remained the same between 1990 and 2008, those of Non-
Annex I countries have increased by 223 per cent (Parikh / Baruah 2012) (see Figure 2). 
Some go as far as to foretell that “[w]ithout a firm, effective and mutually acceptable bed-
rock definition defining the scope and depth of developing country involvement, any truly 
global negotiation will almost inevitably fall apart” (Walsh et al. 2011). Yet most devel-
oping countries support a strict interpretation of CBDR involving a clear differentiation 
between categories of states.7 The rise of emerging economies has made it even harder to 
identify how the responsibilities of states differentiate, increasingly bringing into question 
the CBDR compromise. Ultimately, “trying to reach any new consensus comes down to a 
simple question: what is common and what is different between developed and developing 
countries?” (Deleuil 2012). 
                                                            
6  This includes, for example, the development, periodical update, publication of national inventories of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol (3.1.a); the formulation, implementation, publication and regular update of national 
and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by 
addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol (3.1.b); and taking climate change considerations into account, to 
the extent feasible, in relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ 
appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated and determined nationally, with a 
view to minimising adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the 
environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change (3.1.f). 
7  This includes China and India: see section 3.3 for descriptions of the positions of these countries and 
others. 
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participation. With this in mind, Tables 1–3 present (non-exhaustive) lists of pertinent 
proposals according to three distinct categories8: 
• Approach. This is a very basic first step that fits in a broader equity debate (as op-
posed to the debate: How or to whom should emissions be attributed? This step is 
crucial before decisions can be made accordingly on who should reduce their emis-
sions by how much. Currently, the UNFCCC processes are based on inter-state nego-
tiations and, related to this, allocates emissions to producers. This is not likely to 
change, and therefore many of the mechanisms proposed under “approach” are super-
fluous. Albeit, the inclusion of this category allows for a certain filtering of proposals, 
which benefits the “differentiation” and “participation mechanism” categories. 
• Differentiation. Once emissions have been attributed, a logical next step is to differ-
entiate emission limitation and reduction responsibilities. Agreeing on a basis for dif-
ferentiation and corresponding criteria is, of course, the political crux of the matter. 
Negotiators are faced with a host of sensitive issues in that respect. These concern not 
only the basis for differentiation as such (e.g. responsibility for emissions; costs of 
mitigation and capacity to mitigate; vulnerability to climate change impacts, etc.), but 
also touch on related questions that include choosing between types of commitments, 
and the need for dynamic adjustments (as opposed to static differentiation). 
• Participation mechanisms. Finally, once the basis for differentiation has been decid-
ed upon, universal participation can be ensured through a number of participation 
mechanisms. These are mechanisms that make participation more attractive to, for in-
stance, those parties with lower capacities or restrictive developmental and economic 
circumstances. 
Progress 
Until now, no balance between the conflicting claims of states has been found (Deleuil 
2012). At the same time, the global economic crisis, mostly affecting Annex I countries, 
puts the “respective capabilities” add-on to the CBDR principle into a different perspective. 
In recent years, the gap between the responsibilities of Annex I and Non-Annex I countries is 
perceived to be closing in international climate negotiations (cf. Deleuil 2012). For example, 
developed country parties have “nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions” 
and developing country parties now have “nationally appropriate mitigation actions”. Simi-
larly, in the ADP, some parties emphasise that the provisions and structure of Annex I and 
Non-Annex I groupings are sufficient for differentiation, whereas other parties are looking 
towards indicators such as total emissions volume, emissions per unit of GDP, population and 
technological advancement in order to differentiate (ADP 2013). 
 
                                                            
8  These categories and the following tables serve to structure the debate and to capture some of the key 
proposals that are under discussion. As such, they neither claim to be exhaustive in content nor perfect 
in their conceptual substance. Indeed, it can be argued that participation mechanisms represent in them-
selves a differentiation, or that “survival emissions” represent an approach to allocating emissions ra-
ther than a means of differentiation. Yet, they provide a consistent reference base for the remainder of 
this discussion paper, as the following examples of other manifestations of CBDR follow the same 
structure and provided analogous tables.  
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Table 1: Approaches to attribute greenhouse gas emissions among UNFCCC parties 
 Mechanism Proposed by Explanation 
A
pp
ro
ac
h 
Budget  
approach  
Horstmann and 
Scholz (2011); 
WBGU (2009); 
Honkonen (2009) 
The budget approach first assesses how much GHG can still be 
emitted before global warming probably exceeds 2°C, and then 
divides emissions budgets among countries. India presented a 
budget approach in 2011 based on equal emission rights. The 
WBGU presented a similar approach with emission rights to 
2050, based on 2010 population numbers. Both proposals in-
clude tradable rights, making the budget approach more  
flexible and target-based than earlier proposals.9 
Contraction 
and  
convergence 
BASIC Experts 
(2011) 
This approach is similar to the one above, but proposed by 
countries rather than research. Each country will start out with 
emission entitlements that equal its current real emissions level. 
Over time, the emissions converge to equal its per capita  
entitlements, while the overall global budget contracts to  
accommodate the emissions-reduction objective. 
Greenhouse 
Development 
Rights (GDR) 
approach 
http://gdrights.org/ GDR debuted in 2004 and differs from the emission rights and 
budget approach in the sense that it is an effort-sharing  
framework. GDR quantifies the equity principles of the  
UNFCCC through an analytic environment within which  
people can express their preferred interpretation of the  
convention’s equity principles and then examine its  
implications for any country. GDR models an “equity spec-
trum” in which there are not static annexes: it is based on dy-
namic indicators of responsibility, capacity and development – 
indicators that change over time. 
Define re-
sponsible 
actor 
Dellink et al. 
(2009) 
Which actor should be held responsible: states, businesses or 
individual citizens? States, as such, are not emitters of  
greenhouse gases, but they may have the power to regulate 
emissions and have taken on international legal obligations to 
do so. Holding businesses or even individuals responsible 
might prove much more complicated. 
Attribute 
emissions to 
consumers, 
not producers 
Dellink et al. 
(2009); Harris 
and Symons 
(2013) 
Emissions are normally attributed to the source. From an ethi-
cal perspective, it may make more sense to attribute emissions 
to the consumers of a good. For instance, a large proportion of 
China’s emissions are related to the production of goods that 
are imported by – and consumed in – OECD countries (Dellink 
et al. 2009). Consumption-based emission targets would reduce 
the competitiveness implications of differentiated national 
targets, and the case for negotiating mechanisms to tax emis-
sions embodied in  
                                                            
9  Honkonen (2009) argues that budgets could be assigned using Kant’s categorical imperative. This way 
of motivation of action entails that one should act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at 
the same time, want that it should become a universal law. Applied in the context of burden-sharing of 
CO2 emission reductions, the rule would mean that each country would choose an emissions abatement 
level, at least as large as the uniform abatement level it would like all countries to undertake. This 
would reveal countries’ true preferences towards taking action (Honkonen 2009). Budgets could also 
be assigned based on utilitarianism, which is a form of consequentialism. Utilitarianism condemns acts 
that reduce the overall good for those involved. However, this leaves some space for free-riders that are 
unwilling to commit. 
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Table 1 (cont.): Approaches to attribute greenhouse gas emissions among UNFCCC parties 
 Mechanism Proposed by Explanation 
A
pp
ro
ac
h 
  developed world consumption (e.g. via equalising border  
adjustments) would be strengthened. This alternative approach 
to implementing “differentiated responsibility” might facilitate 
more cooperative outcomes in climate negotiations  
(Harris / Symons 2013). 
Sectoral-based 
differentiation 
 
Sawa (2008); 
Honkonen (2009) 
 
Sectoral approaches can determine politically acceptable  
national targets and domestic allowance allocations based on 
reduction potentials from technological perspectives, including 
in developing countries. To prevent ineffective multiple  
sector-specific negotiation processes, Sawa proposes grouping 
sectors into 1) energy-intensive industries that are exposed to  
international trade and leakage issues;  
2) sectors that are mostly domestic, such as electricity and road 
transport, for which benchmarks and best practices can be 
relatively easily identified; 3) household and commercial  
sectors, or sectors that encompass a wide range of technolo-
gies, thus complicating indicator-setting and international  
comparison of indicators. 
Honkonen (2009) states that the European Union (EU) also 
had a burden-sharing scheme based on a triptych approach, 
dividing the economy in the power sector, internationally 
oriented heavy industry, and a “domestic” sector. Emis-
sions are treated differently but equally across the EU 
member states. This approach moved the attention away 
from comparing contributions and fairness among member 
states towards comparing contributions and fairness across 
sectors within the EU. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Table 2: Ways to differentiate mitigation responsibilities among UNFCCC parties 
 Mechanism Proposed by Explanation 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
Same  
obligations, 
differentiated 
stringency or 
commitments 
Deleuil (2012) All countries would be subject to the responsibility of limiting 
or reducing their GHG emissions, but some would have a 
more stringent obligation than others. 
Within the obligations, countries could have different types of 
commitments, with some countries taking on QELROs,10 and 
others adopting renewable energy targets or energy-efficiency 
targets.  
Differentiate 
among  
Non-Annex I  
countries 
Parikh and  
Baruah (2012); 
Depledge and 
Yamin (2009) 
The responsibilities of Annex I countries remain supreme in 
tackling climate change, but future differentiation of  
obligations among developing countries is a prerequisite to 
any sensible engagement of the wide variety of developing 
countries. Non-Annex I countries could be grouped, with 
some countries having more responsibilities to mitigate  
emissions than others. Parikh and Baruah (2012) propose to 
                                                            
10  QELROs (Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Objectives) are the greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction commitments that developed countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol made, 
provided in percentage terms relevant to base year or period. 
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Table 2 (cont.): Ways to differentiate mitigation responsibilities among UNFCCC parties 
 Mechanism Proposed by Explanation 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
  classify developing countries into three groups, based on three 
criteria and including benchmarks. These categories are: 1) 
CO2 emissions per capita, which reflects income levels, the 
types of energy resources and technologies available for 
individuals in a country; 2) total CO2 emissions, as a criteri-
on to group countries; 3) carbon emissions / GDP intensity, 
to capture the efficiency of the economy, including produc-
tion and consumption technologies. 
Include crite-
ria other than 
economic 
development 
and emissions 
Deleuil (2012); 
Karousakis,  
Guay and  
Philibert (2008) 
In their comprehensive review of existing indicators and 
differentiation frameworks, Karousakis, Guay and Philibert 
collated the following: 
Total national GHG emissions 
Emissions per capita 
Share of global emissions 
Proportion of world average per capita emissions 
Emissions per GDP 
Emissions growth rate 
GDP per capita 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
Cumulative emissions 
Climate vulnerability indicator 
Institutional indicators 
They conclude that none of the individual indicators is able to 
reflect the multiple principles of Article 3 of the UNFCCC, 
and thus propose “composite indicators”. 
More recent studies look beyond economic development and 
current and future emissions, and consider other indicators to 
set differentiated obligations; these include:  
mitigation potential (Deleuil 2012); 
costs of mitigation (Deleuil 2012); 
emissions per unit of GDP (Parikh / Baruah 2012). 
Indicator 
basket  
CAN (2013a) Based on the convention’s core equity principles, CAN  
proposes to define a basket of indicators that simply but  
adequately represent those principles. These indicators would 
be quantitative and measurable, based on actual time-series 
data, and updated as we move forward in time.  
Differentiate 
between  
luxury goods 
and “survival 
emissions” 
Harris and  
Symons (2013) 
In the context of attributing GHG emissions to consumers 
rather than producers, “survival emissions” for consumption 
by the world’s poor should be priced differently than “luxury 
emissions” associated with the lifestyles of affluent people. 
There is no justification for exempting emissions from con-
sumption of luxury goods simply because they were produced 
in developing countries. These inconsistencies are becoming 
more obvious with the emergence of affluent middle classes 
with corresponding consumption patterns in developing  
countries.  
Source: Authors’ compilation  
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Table 3: Mechanisms to ensure broad participation in global mitigation efforts 
 Mechanism Proposed by Explanation 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
Financial 
compensation 
e.g. Walsh et al. 
(2011);  
Romani and Stern 
(2013) 
All countries would have similar responsibilities towards 
mitigation, but developing countries would be entitled to 
financial compensation for environmental restraint while 
pursuing their humanitarian and development goals. The 
Copenhagen Accord is a step in this direction. Developing 
countries signed up to it on the back of the financial  
commitment of developed countries, and developed countries 
on the back of the pledges made by developing countries. 
These transfers were interpreted (at least by developing  
countries) as being linked to equity: without some attention to 
equity, an agreement would have been very difficult  
(Romani / Stern 2013). 
Compensation can flow to mitigation (for developing  
countries to invest in climate-friendly production processes), 
to adaptation (to compensate for climate change impacts 
caused by countries with the highest historical emissions) or 
“Loss and Damage” (compensate to losses and damages  
associated with climate change impacts, including extreme 
events and slow onset events, in particularly vulnerable  
developing countries). 
Technological 
support / 
Technology 
transfer 
Kreft and Bals 
(2013);  
Shrivastava and 
Goel (2010); 
Winkler (2010) 
Technology transfer towards developing countries is an  
important incentive for developing countries to engage in 
mitigation efforts and a long-standing demand of developing 
country parties in climate negotiations. Accordingly,  
developed country concessions on technology matters are 
considered a key parameter for the conceptual contract zone 
in which a global climate deal may eventually be struck 
(Winkler 2010).  
Joint fulfil-
ment of com-
mitments  
UNFCCC Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol allows for joint fulfilment of 
commitments. It could help a country to accept a higher  
emission-limitation or -reduction target, as it is partly  
forwarded to the group that takes on the joint fulfilment, 
rather than the country itself. In the second commitment  
period of the Kyoto Protocol, EU members states will do so 
based on the condition that the aggregate calculated levels of 
greenhouse gas reductions surpass the agreed levels. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Indeed, the ADP is explicitly tasked to develop “a protocol, another legal instrument or 
an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to all parties [...]” 
(UNFCCC 2011, emphasis added). The practical interpretation of CBDR will thus be 
instrumental to close the “pre-2020 ambition gap”, even as the ADP has consistently 
avoided referring to it so far. Deleuil concludes accordingly that the practice of the 
CBDR principle is changing, sometimes mentioning Article 3, but mostly referring to 
general notions such as equity, national circumstances and specific needs of developing 
countries (Deleuil 2012). 
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The work of the Durban Platform was advanced at COP 18 in Doha during inter-
sessional negotiations in Bonn in May 2013 (see UNFCCC 2012b, decision 2/CP.18; 
IISD 2013a) and COP 19 in Warsaw. It has been acknowledged in this context that the 
work of the ADP shall be guided by the principles of the convention (including Art. 
3.1 on CBDR). Accordingly, many parties consider these principles to be fundamental 
to the ADP’s work (IISD 2013a). While it is widely recognised that action from all 
parties is required, it was also clearly stated by some countries that these actions must 
be differentiated among countries (IISD 2013a). It was thus suggested to have a menu 
of options, or a spectrum of commitments, encompassing a variety of enhanced actions 
and different types of commitments. Mitigation action could be differentiated based on 
absolute economy-wide reduction targets; relative targets / deviation from business as 
usual; carbon budgets; intensity-based targets; and sectoral targets, actions and policies 
(ADP 2013). 
In Warsaw, the draft conclusions of the ADP co-chairs invited all parties to submit 
information on their mitigation activities to the UNFCCC secretariat, including fi-
nance, technology and capacity-building support for mitigation action in developing 
countries (UNFCCC 2013a). In the corresponding decision of COP 19, each party that 
has not done so yet is urged to communicate its quantified economy-wide emission-
reduction target or nationally appropriate mitigation action as applicable (decision 
4/FCCC/ADP/2013/L.4/Add1). In that same decision, developed countries are urged to 
implement this reduction target without delay, to revisit their respective targets, and to 
increase technology, finance and capacity-building support to enable increased mitiga-
tion ambition by developing country parties. Developing countries, in turn, are only 
urged to implement their nationally appropriate mitigation action as communicated and 
to consider further action, while recognising that nationally appropriate mitigation ac-
tions will be taken in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled 
by technology, finance and capacity-building (UNFCCC 2013b). This demonstrates de 
facto differentiation, while avoiding explicit terms such as CBDR or equity. Only the 
annex of the co-chairs’ draft conclusions, denoted as “work in progress” on a “[n]on-
exhaustive list of areas for further reflections”, includes two items on differentiation: 
“differentiation: ways of reflecting” and “ways of putting forward intended nationally 
determined commitments and of considering ambition, equity and fairness, informed 
by science; means of implementation” (UNFCCC 2013a). 
Deleuil (2012) concludes that the CBDR principle is not, in itself, a vital condition for 
the continuation of differential treatment in the regime. However, he also states that 
the clearer the future place and meaning of CBDR, the clearer state categories taken 
into account – and obligations they are subjected to – will be and the easier compliance 
and review will be for parties and the treaty bodies. 
This chapter further elaborates on the current positions on CBDR of parties to the UN-
FCCC. First, the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy is further explained, as this is the 
basis of the current ways in which CBDR is brought into practice under the UNFCCC 
and its Kyoto Protocol. Second, this chapter provides insights into the positions to-
wards CBDR of some of key players in the UN climate negotiations: the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS), Brazil, China, the EU, India, South Africa and the United 
States. 
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3.2 The politics of dichotomy: CBDR, GDP and historical emissions 
In 1992 the responsibilities of parties were differentiated according to the dichotomy 
that was effectively introduced by the UNFCCC’s Annex I. This Annex I was comprised 
of 43 parties, which included all of the OECD member states (as of 1992) plus a host of 
additional states undergoing the process of transition to a market economy in the wake 
of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Conversely, all other parties were invariably labelled as 
Non-Annex I, whereby the resulting Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy ultimately re-
flects the post-colonial division of the world. Originally, the main criterion to include a 
state in a given Annex was the level of economic development (Deleuil 2012). 
Croatia, Australia and others have stated that this does not reflect current realities (see 
Deleuil 2012). This section compares GDP per capita data from 2010 and 1992 to test 
this statement in terms of the economic situations of Annex I and Non-Annex I parties. 
If anything, the dichotomy reflects current realities better than past realities. For ex-
ample, 33 out of the 43 Annex I parties are among the top 50 of countries with the 
highest GDP per capita in 2010, four more than in 1992 (see Table 4). However, the 
comparison also shows that the Annex I parties are not a homogenous group. Although 
the Annex I parties are well-represented among the countries with the highest GDPs 
per capita, there are also 32 Non-Annex I parties with higher GDPs per capita than the 
five Annex I parties with the lowest GDP per capita. Without prejudging the relative 
value or adequacy of the mitigation efforts of individual Annex I countries, it seems 
safe to say that the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy is not well reflected in terms of 
parties’ GDP per capita. 
Table 4: Comparison of Annex I and Non-Annex 1 parties’ GDP per capita, for 1992 and 2010 
 Number of Annex I countries among 
[...] of parties with the highest GDP 
per capita: 
Number of Non-Annex I countries 
with higher GDP per capita than [...] 
 Top 30 Top 50 Annex I lowest 5 Annex I lowest 10 
1992 23 29 ca. 40 ca. 30 
2010 24 33* 32 17 
*As there are 43 Annex I parties in total, this means 10 of them are not among the top 50 of parties with the highest GDP per capita. 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
The data from 1990 and 2010 of the Human Development Index (HDI) were also analysed 
as an indicator for parties’ development levels.11 All Annex I parties are in the top 50 of 
countries with the highest HDI (see Table 5). There is only a minor increase in the number 
of Non-Annex I parties that have a higher HDI that the lowest-scoring Annex I parties. 
Altogether, the prevailing dichotomy thus appears better reflected in HDI terms than in 
terms of GDP per capita. 
                                                            
11  Data for 1990 and 2012 was not available for all Parties. Belarus, Czech Republic, European Union, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Poland, Slovenia and Turkey are therefore left out of the analysis, leaving the 
represented number of Annex I Parties in this analysis at 35. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Annex I and Non-Annex 1 parties’ HDI, for 1990 and 2010 
 Number of Annex I countries among 
[...] of parties with the highest HDI 
rank: 
Number of Non-Annex I countries 
with higher HDI rank than [...] 
 Top 30 Top 50 Annex I lowest 5 Annex I lowest 10 
1990 25 35 9 7 
2010 25 35 11 8 
The Annex I parties Belarus, Czech Republic, European Union, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Poland, Slovenia and Turkey are excluded 
from analysis, leaving the number of represented Annex I parties at 35. 
Source: UNDP (2013) 
The original Annex I / Non-Annex I party dichotomy was retained in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. Most Annex I parties agreed on legally binding targets to limit or reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions. Non-Annex I parties also ratified the protocol, but it 
does not include binding targets for them to limit or reduce their emissions. Emissions 
of developing countries are allowed to grow in accordance with their development 
needs. The “common obligations” in the UNFCCC of Non-Annex I parties are there-
fore sometimes criticised as being nominal (see Honkonen 2009, 131). 
Historical emissions have largely been caused by Annex I countries, and this is com-
monly reiterated as a reason to attribute the responsibility of mitigation onto these par-
ties. A paper of BASIC experts (2011), for example, states that – in the context of his-
torical responsibility – an effective international climate change regime with a strong 
Kyoto Protocol needs to be built, with ambitious targets for Annex I countries as the 
basis for this effort. In a recent joint political statement of the “BASIC plus” countries, 
the participating countries recalled that “responsibility for climate change rests on all 
countries, differentiated according to the extent to which they have contributed histor-
ically to the urgent problem which we now face […]” (BASIC Ministerial Meeting 
2013). 
However, the exact amount of historical emissions is difficult to assess and probably 
impossible to agree on. It depends, for example, on whether emissions from basic 
needs should be exempted; whether the causal contribution lies with consumers or 
producers; what kinds of greenhouse gases are taken into account (including the ques-
tion of their atmospheric lifetimes); and whether land-use change is included (not just 
in terms of emissions, but also in terms of sink capacity) (Dellink et al. 2008). An ex-
ample of the strong variation of historical responsibility is given in Figure 3. The vari-
ation of historical responsibilities in this figure is only caused by the inclusion of dif-
ferent GHG types. It illustrates, for instance, that the inclusion of emissions from Land 
Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) makes for a distinctly different picture. 
Furthermore, it needs to be determined whether “historical emissions” commence, for 
example, with the beginning of the industrial revolution or with the first scientific evi-
dence of human-induced climate change (see Figure 4). Arguing on the basis of the 
polluter pays principle, the WBGU suggests that 1990 reasonably qualifies as a year  
of reference, because it saw the publication of the First Assessment Report of the Inter- 
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3.3 Perspectives on CBDR: A selection of parties’ positions 
Perceptions of equity and fairness are typically based on countries’ specific backgrounds 
and particular economic as well as social circumstances (Hallding et al. 2011). This sec-
tion therefore provides an overview of several key parties and a party group in the UN-
FCCC climate change negotiations and their specific position towards the principle of 
CBDR. The section includes positions of two major historical contributors of emissions 
(the EU and the United States), four emerging economies with diverse characteristics in 
terms of emissions, populations and types of emission patterns (Brazil, China, India and 
South Africa) and the party group AOSIS, which is taken up in the analysis, as it repre-
sents a group of vulnerable countries that pro-actively engages in the CBDR debate. They 
are provided in alphabetic order. 
3.3.1 Alliance of Small Island States  
Small island countries realised their disproportionate vulnerability to the adverse effects of 
climate change early on (Betzold / Castro / Weiler 2011). Even though the respective 
countries have diverse backgrounds, they are characterised by remoteness, growing popu-
lation densities and being prone to natural disasters. Rising sea levels constitute the major 
threat related to climate change (Alfaro‐Pelico 2012). Consequently, in 1990 AOSIS was 
established in order to speak with one voice in international climate change negotiations 
(Betzold / Castro / Weiler 2011).14 
AOSIS has been pushing continuously to raise the ambitions of the climate regime (Eck-
ersley 2012). During negotiations around the Kyoto Protocol, small island states favoured 
proposals that would have admitted developing countries to unilaterally adopt voluntary 
mitigation targets, if and when they wished to do so. However, this was dismissed due to 
the refusal of major developing countries (Depledge / Yamin 2009). When it comes to 
adaptation, it is due to the persistence of small island states and least-developed countries 
(LDCs) that adaptation has become such an important item on the UNFCCC agenda (De-
pledge / Yamin 2009). 
More recently, during COP 15 in Copenhagen, AOSIS made it clear that they expect all 
parties to undertake national mitigation actions according to their common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities. They called upon developed countries to 
take the lead and aim for reducing emissions a minimum of 45 per cent below 1990 levels 
by 2020 collectively, and urged developing countries to “aim to achieve significant devia-
tions from baselines by 2020” (AOSIS 2009, 5). At COP 17 in Durban, AOSIS and other 
vulnerable countries strongly pleaded for a legally binding agreement. Although other 
developing countries initially opposed this, their resistance weakened in the face of strong 
efforts by the EU and AOSIS and the danger of losing the Kyoto Protocol (Rajamani 
2013). AOSIS emphasised that actions will be required by all parties, although historical 
emissions by developed countries should be an important issue in the new agreement. De-
                                                            
14  Unlike the EU, AOSIS is not officially a party to the UNFCCC, but functions primarily as an ad hoc 
lobby and negotiating coalition for Small Island Developing States within the United Nations system. 
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veloped countries should thus “demonstrate leadership to combat climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof” (AOSIS 2013, 2). 
3.3.2 Brazil 
Brazil has a unique GHG emissions profile (Viola 2013). Due to deforestation, it holds the 
largest emission rates globally for activities that do not emanate from the energy sector 
(Rong 2010). Although deforestation rates have decreased since 2009, an increase was 
recognised in the period between August 2012 and July 2013 (INPE 2013). Brazil’s ener-
gy production, in turn, is largely based on hydropower, and therefore largely renewable. 
In the beginning of climate change negotiations, Brazil’s position was basically in line 
with the “traditional non-commitment position” of the G77 and China (Kasa / Gullberg / 
Heggelund 2008, 1050). In particular, Brazil refused to discuss emissions from deforesta-
tion in climate change negotiations (Kasa 2013). This stance was also reflected in the 
“Brazilian Proposal”, a proposal for an agreement on future climate policy that was pre-
sented in 1997 (see e.g. Wei et al. 2013). Taking into account historical responsibilities, it 
aimed to depict developed countries’ share of overall temperature rises, and to respective-
ly set emission allowances (Winkler / Rajamani 2013). Developed countries opposed this 
proposal because the whole burden of emission reductions would have been on them (Wei 
et al. 2013). 
A gradual shift from this position has been observed since 2005 (see Kasa 2013 for a de-
tailed analysis). For instance, during COP 12 in 2006, Brazil suggested establishing a 
global fund to assist countries in reducing deforestation. With this, Brazil gave up on its 
long-held opposition to connecting deforestation policies with global financial tools 
(Vieira 2013). At COP 15 in Copenhagen (2009), Brazil made voluntary pledges to reduce 
emissions by 36.1–38.9 per cent on the basis of a business as usual (BAU) scenario until 
2020 (Lucon / Romeiro / Pacca 2013). At the same time, however, Brazil also declared 
that this type of voluntary pledge should not be seen as a parameter for other emerging 
economies (Kasa 2013; Viola 2013). It hence adopted an “ambiguous” position – between 
its own actions and what should be asked from other countries (Kasa 2013, 1055) – in this 
way preserving its traditional alliance with China and India (Viola 2013). 
In line with small island developing states (SIDS), LDCs, the EU and other countries, 
Brazil has pleaded for a binding agreement under the Durban Platform (Deleuil 2012). In 
its submission to the UNFCCC on matters related to the work of the ADP, Brazil states 
that the agreement must consider the principle of CBDR-RC and the legal separation of 
commitments between Annex I and Non-Annex I parties, with all parties enhancing efforts 
on mitigation. Brazil is of the view that each party should define its own contributions to 
the 2015 agreement, taking into consideration historical responsibilities, national circum-
stances and capacities (Government of Brazil 2013). In this context, during COP 19 in 
Warsaw, Brazil brought forward the idea that the IPCC should develop a reference meth-
odology to account for historical responsibilities. This suggestion was supported by the 
BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and others, but was opposed, for 
instance, by the United States, the EU, Australia and Canada (IISD 2013d). 
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3.3.3 China 
With the world largest population and high economic growth rates, China is often seen as 
one of the central players in international climate change negotiations. Its GHG emissions 
have more than doubled in the past decade (Leal-Arcas 2013). China has also surpassed 
the United States as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in absolute terms. If this rapid 
growth continues, China’s emissions will account for approximately a quarter of the 
world’s annual total in 2030 (Walsh et al. 2011). 
In UN climate negotiations, China’s role must be assessed in light of its economic situa-
tion (Tian / Whalley 2008). China’s economic growth relies heavily on the use of fossil 
fuels, causing high rates of greenhouse gas emissions (Kasa / Gullberg / Heggelund 2008). 
Chinese policy-makers see their country on a long-term high-growth path, which will lead 
to substantial poverty reduction (Tian / Whalley 2008). In the 1990s, Premier Li Peng in-
dicated that economic development takes precedence over environmental protection, and 
that developed countries have a responsibility to provide financial resources and technolo-
gy to compensate developing countries (Stalley 2013). China considers mitigation the 
main responsibility of developed countries and has repeatedly insisted for fairness and 
equity (Stalley 2013) while making no commitment to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Moreover, China has assumed a leadership role within the group of developing countries, 
and the G77 in particular (Kasa / Gullberg / Heggelund 2008; Walsh et al. 2011). Being 
one of the “most vocal advocates” of the principle of CBDR, China has repeatedly moti-
vated developing countries to stand together on issues concerning fairness and equity 
(Stalley 2013, 4). Moreover, China strategically employs the principle of CBDR to frame 
climate change as a “North-South issue” (Stalley 2013, 3). It has purported that CBDR is a 
permanent element in climate change negotiations that has contributed to deadlock due to 
conflicting interpretations of the CBDR principle by the different parties (Harris / Symons 
2013). Deleuil asserts that developing countries, among them China, deploy formal lan-
guage to “imply a compelling legal nature” of the CBDR principle, and thus attempt to 
urge developed countries to comply with their terms (Deleuil 2012, 275). 
In the meantime, with a view towards increasing recognition of the adverse effects of cli-
mate change, severe domestic air pollution, energy security as well as profound external 
pressures, China has increasingly been taking domestic action (see e.g. Leal-Arcas 2013; 
Stalley 2013; Walsh et al. 2011). At the Bonn Climate Change Conference in April/May 
2013, the Chinese delegation named several national targets regarding reductions in carbon 
intensity and targets for the use of non-fossil energy, its electricity mix as well as carbon 
sinks (IISD 2013c). China’s current Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) puts emphasis on econom-
ic and industrial restructuring that will lead towards a greener, more efficient economy with 
lower carbon emissions. As part of the plan, China is developing regional domestic carbon-
trading programmes and experimenting with emission taxes (Leal-Arcas 2013). 
However, more domestic action does not necessarily mean a different position on CBDR-
RC. The start of the negotiations around the ADP – tasked to develop “a protocol, another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to all 
parties [...]” (UNFCCC 2011, emphasis added) – also marks a shift in the position of many 
of the developing countries that have been rejecting consideration of any binding commit-
ments for a long time. However, it is still uncertain which responsibilities – and under what 
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conditions – developing countries, and especially China, will accept (Torney 2013). In its 
submission on the work of the ADP, China once more stressed that the outcome needs to 
reflect historical responsibilities of developed countries, and that the differentiation between 
developing and developed countries was “the very foundation of the Convention regime.” 
Moreover, it is emphasised that development situations and the capabilities of developing 
countries would need to be fully considered (Government of China 2013, 1). 
3.3.4 European Union 
There are large differences between the per capita GHG emission of different EU member 
states, but as a group of countries, the EU is the biggest historical emitter of greenhouse 
gasses (see e.g. Dellink et al. 2008, 2009).15 Through the adoption of comparatively strict 
emission-reduction targets and ambitious climate policies in the past, the EU is often still 
seen as taking on climate leadership (see Jordan / Rayner 2010). These targets of this big-
gest regional block of Annex I parties might be explained with the important role of ener-
gy in the European integration process. Furthermore, intensive industrialisation over time 
caused increasing natural degradation, which in turn led to growing environmental aware-
ness and an emergent green movement. These topics were thus incorporated into the Eu-
ropean political agenda (Mehling / Frenkil 2013). In international climate change negotia-
tions, the EU was able to achieve progress during some critical moments. For example, 
after the United States backed out, the EU has been successful in making other states rati-
fy the Kyoto Protocol, which only holds mitigation commitments for Annex I countries. 
Furthermore, it managed to spark the interest of other parties in its climate change policies 
and Emissions Trading Scheme (Lindenthal 2009). Looking closer at the EU’s more re-
cent position in climate-related topics, critics argue, however, that its ambitious stance has 
been overtaken by other parties (e.g. Bals et al. 2013). For instance, its emission-reduction 
target of 20 per cent compared to 1990-levels is outperformed by a range of other coun-
tries. As the EU’s major economies did not achieve positive progress in domestic climate 
change legislation in 2012, EU climate policy slowed down (e.g. Bals et al. 2013; for a 
comprehensive treatment, see Jordan et al. 2010). 
In 2008, the EU decided to broaden its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and incorporate 
emissions from international flights to and from Europe. Particularly China and India 
heavily criticised this step and ordered its airlines not to abide with the regulation (Eck-
ersley 2013), inter alia arguing that this was a violation of the CBDR principle (Scott / 
Rajamani 2012). After rising protests from other countries, including the United States, 
the integration of international aviation in the ETS was postponed by one year in 2012 
(Egenhofer / Alessi 2013), but the EU will bring it back on the agenda if the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) does not deliver on developing a global scheme to 
reduce emissions from flights (European Commission 2012).16 
                                                            
15  In 2008, the GHG emissions per capita ranged from 5.2 tonnes of CO2 equivalent in Latvia to 25.8 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent in Luxembourg (EEA 2012). 
16  ICAO was tasked to devise a strategy to reduce international emissions from aviation. International 
aviation and shipping were not included in the Kyoto Protocol because countries could not agree on 
where to allocate their emission (see also section 4.5). 
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During climate negotiations in 2009, the European delegation proposed to shift function-
ing parts of the Kyoto Protocol into a new global agreement. Developing countries reject-
ed this, blaming the EU for trying to demolish the Kyoto Protocol and CBDR. In some 
ways changing its position, the EU agreed to a second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2011. Next to that, in what is described as part of a wider deal, the ADP was 
launched, which should work towards a 2015 agreement that comprises all parties (Torney 
2013). In accordance with other industrialised states, the EU has demanded that a post-
2020 climate regime should be based on a more differentiated interpretation of CBDR-RC 
(Winkler / Rajamani 2013). It hence expects developing countries with large amounts of 
emissions to implement mitigation measures (Torney 2013). 
Already in 2008, the EU Council stated that developing countries as a group – in particu-
lar the most advanced among them – would have to limit their emissions by 15 to 30 per 
cent below their BAU projections for 2020, respecting the principle of CBDR-RC (Coun-
cil of the European Union 2008, 6). The EU consequently is promoting a legally binding 
agreement comprising all major emitters (Torney 2013). 
In recent preparations for discussions within the ADP, the EU stresses that the 2015 
agreement should fully respect the principles of the convention and parties’ common but 
differentiated responsibilities and their specific circumstances. Yet, each party should 
make commitments to limit or reduce its emissions. These commitments should be fair, 
adequate and ambitious contributions towards the collective objective to limit global 
warming to 2°C, in accordance with each country’s responsibilities and capabilities as 
well as national circumstances and development needs. The EU is considering a step-wise 
approach that leads to inscripted commitments of all countries in a 2015 agreement. These 
can be different kind of commitments, but they should be transparent, quantifiable, com-
parable, verifiable and ambitious (EU 2013). 
3.3.5 India 
Poverty is widespread among India’s 1.2 billion citizens and development issues continue 
to be the country’s top priority. Climate change-related issues were long considered as 
mere side effects of other policies. Despite these challenges, India’s economy has experi-
enced high growth rates, leading to rising energy demand. Coal will be central in the de-
velopment of the economy, leading to projections of high emission growth rates over the 
next decades. Currently, it is estimated that India contributes about 5 per cent of all global 
greenhouse gas emissions, ranking it fourth in the world in absolute emissions. However, 
its per capita emissions are only a fraction of those of developed countries, for example 
about a tenth of the per capita figures for the United States (Rastogi 2013). 
India has long been advocating the CBDR principle and has resisted pressure from devel-
oped countries to accept a single framework for mitigation actions incorporating all parties 
(Raghunandan 2012). Being long “glued to a do-nothing position” (Raghunandan 2012, 
126), a change in India’s stance on climate change negotiations was first noted in 2008, 
when its National Action Plan on Climate Change was released (Rastogi 2013). Another 
important move was the commitment to voluntary carbon-intensity reduction targets of 
20–25 per cent from 2005 levels by 2020, first announced in Copenhagen in 2009. Even 
though it is debated whether these targets will require additional efforts or be fulfilled 
while achieving economic progress and the associated rise in energy efficiency, this 
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showed a renunciation of India’s mere focus on equal per capita emission rights (Shukla / 
Dhar 2011; Walsh et al. 2011). Jairam Ramesh, Minister of Environment and Forestry 
from 2009 to 2011, strongly contributed to this more pro-active role. Plans of Ramesh to 
give up India’s traditional defensive position in international negotiations were, however, 
met with criticism, even from his own party and India’s environmental non-governmental 
organisations, who feared financial and technological assistance was being put at risk 
(Michaelowa / Michaelowa 2011). 
During negotiations about the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action at COP 17, India 
passionately emphasised the need to build the new talks on equity. After having received 
some support from other developing countries, including China, in the beginning (e.g. 
Khor 2012), India eventually stood alone with its rejection of negotiations on an agree-
ment incorporating all parties. Many vulnerable developing countries also affiliated them-
selves with the EU in pushing India to agree (Rajamani 2012). In its recent submission on 
the work of the ADP, India did, however, re-emphasise that “applicable to all parties” 
does not mean a change to the annexes of the convention. In its view, Annex I parties have 
to continue quantified emission-reduction targets, whereas Non-Annex I parties – taking 
into consideration historical responsibilities and capabilities – will implement nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions facilitated through finance and technology transfer (Gov-
ernment of India 2013). 
3.3.6 South Africa  
In international comparison, the economy of South Africa is very energy-intensive. This is 
largely caused by the massive use of coal and a landscape of respective industries. At the 
same time, the country has had to deal with extensive socio-economic inequalities and de-
velopment needs that originated during the time of apartheid (Winkler / Marquand 2009). 
As a member of the BASIC group, South Africa shares some important characteristics and 
viewpoints with the other BASIC countries. Its distinct background, however, explains its 
specific position in climate change negotiations (Never 2012). Due to South Africa’s lag-
ging development status and comparatively high per capita emissions, it prefers a “multi-
criteria approach” that takes into account historical emissions as well as human develop-
ment and respective capacities (Hallding et al. 2011, 101). 
To shifting to a less carbon-intensive economy, there is consensus that South Africa’s 
emissions will need to peak no later than the 2020–2025 period and plateau before starting 
to drop (Winkler / Marquand 2009). In advance of COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, South 
Africa announced voluntary CO2 emission-reduction targets of 34 per cent below BAU 
projections by 2020 (Death 2011), under the condition of an agreement on a global climate 
deal and international support (Vorster / Winkler / Jooste 2011). This national reduction 
target was met with scepticism by civil society groups, who suggested it was unrealistic 
(Death 2011). It was also harshly criticised by African civil society organisations, which 
blamed South Africa for breaking the “collective responsibility”. They charged that the 
unilateral decision was giving rise to disunity within the continent as well as with the G77 
and China (PANA 2008). The construction of new coal power plants and weak domestic 
environmental policies have also made it difficult to understand how the stated target can 
be achieved (Death 2011). 
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In contrast to South Africa’s domestic performance, Death (2011, 469) acknowledges a 
“successful global performance” of South Africa in environmental politics. During UN-
FCCC negotiations, the country often takes on the role of a “bridge builder”, both among 
parties of the G77 and between developing and industrialised states (Hallding et al. 2011, 
54). South Africa favoured a new legally binding agreement at COP 17 in Durban (Ra-
jamani 2012), after having already shown an interest in the idea earlier (Hallding et al. 
2011). India and others opposed such an agreement, arguing that it would not be in line 
with the CBDR-RC principle (Rajamani 2012). This indicates that South Africa is ap-
proaching CBDR-RC more flexibly. This is also reflected in South Africa’s call for legally 
binding, differentiated commitments for all parties (Government of South Africa 2013). In 
particular, the country is arguing for absolute emission-reduction targets for developed 
countries and relative targets for developing countries with deviations from BAU emis-
sions (IISD 2013c, 8). 
3.3.7 United States 
The United States ranks at the higher end of GHG emissions per capita worldwide. In 
2010, the average per capita emission was 21.6 metric tons of CO2 equivalent (compared 
to, e.g., India 2.2; Brazil 8.3; China 8.3; South Africa 8.4) (EC JRC 2011). The United 
States is currently the second-largest emitter after China, in terms of cumulative emis-
sions (World Bank 2013), and the largest historical contributor of greenhouse gas emis-
sions (Ellermann / Höhne / Müller 2011). The largest share of US CO2 emissions stems 
from electricity generation, which is to a large extent based on coal, and transport (EPA 
2012). In an international comparison, US energy prices are low (IEA 2013), and energy 
use is high (World Bank 2013). 
The United States was the major critic of the Kyoto Protocol (Honkonen 2009). In 
1997 the US Senate adopted the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which stated that the country 
would not participate in a climate change agreement without binding emission-
reduction targets for developing countries (Eckersley 2013). The main argument was 
that the protocol – built on CBDR and implying that developing countries were exempt 
from binding targets – would lead to an unfair economic disadvantage (Honkonen 
2009). The lion’s share of future emissions growth would take place in developing 
countries, but these emissions were not covered under the climate regime. Although 
many developed countries acquiesced to this inevitable outcome, it opened a fault line 
between the United States and developing countries, especially China. Neither the 
Chinese nor the US governments wanted to accept what they perceived to be an unfair 
agreement, and both had diverging conceptions of “what constitutes a level playing 
field” (Harris / Symons 2013, 20). 
Under the George W. Bush administration, climate change was not seen as constituting a 
substantial problem (Harrison 2007). The United States undertook basically no 
mitigation actions until Barack Obama entered the White House. He confirmed the GHG 
emission-reduction target of the United States of 17 per cent below 2005 levels by 2020, 
as was described by the Copenhagen Accord (Mehling / Frenkil 2013). Following that 
announcement, China and India likewise came up with national carbon-intensity 
reduction pledges (Brunnée 2010). 
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In June 2013, President Obama presented “The president’s climate action plan”, which 
includes targets and mitigation measures in various sectors. For example, energy-
efficiency standards are supposed to reduce carbon emissions by a minimum of 3 bil-
lion metric tons cumulatively by 2030, and it is planned to double electricity genera-
tion from renewable energy by 2020 (The White House 2013). Critical voices, as for 
example the WWF, say that carbon cannot be reduced to the levels needed with this 
plan; nevertheless, it can be implemented without waiting for approval from the US 
Congress (Molho 2013).  
In UN climate negotiations, the United States argues that developing countries should 
take on more responsibilities as they evolve and, hence, call for a more nuanced inter-
pretation of CBDR and respective capabilities (Winkler / Rajamani 2013). In the draft 
decision of the Durban Platform, no reference was made to principles of equity and 
CBDR-RC, partly because the United States opposed any mention of it, whereas India, 
especially, strongly insisted on it and declared that if such a protocol was developed, it 
would be a dismissal of CBDR-RC. At COP 18 in Doha in 2012, the final text of the 
adopted work plan for the Durban Platform did not incorporate the principle itself 
(Khor 2012); it only stated that the outcome shall have legal force under the conven-
tion (IISD 2012, 2). In the view of several legal experts from developing countries, the 
mentioning of “under the convention” means that the outcomes must be consistent 
with CBDR-RC (Khor 2012, 99). The United States declared its disagreement: “this 
[...] will not be the basis on which the US will engage in the work of the ADP” (IISD 
2012, 5). 
In its submission to the UNFCCC on the 2015 agreement, it is suggested that commit-
ments should be defined in a transparent way, individually by each party on the basis 
of national circumstances. The United States rejects incorporating existing annexes 
into the 2015 agreement, arguing that these would not reflect contemporary realities 
(United States Government 2013). 
3.4 State of debate 
CBDR continues to be a key notion under the UNFCCC, and all parties consider its 
underlying notion of equity to be important. Parties do, however, interpret the notion 
of CBDR differently, based on a variety of factors, such as historical responsibilities, 
capabilities, national circumstances and development needs. The Annex I / Non-Annex 
I dichotomy represents a static – and subsequently anachronistic – distinction that has 
proved to be overly simplistic and gives way to extreme positions that trouble con-
structive negotiations under the UNFCCC. Moving beyond this dichotomy is thus par-
amount to enable parties to differentiate responsibilities in a way that better reflects 
the diversification of state groups and country coalitions that negotiate under the UN-
FCCC, notably among developing countries. 
Parties’ different interpretations of the notion of CBDR are exacerbated by a tendency 
to wait for other parties to take on a larger role in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions 
under a prospective “post-Kyoto” international climate agreement. The examples in 
this chapter demonstrate that to come to an ambitious international climate agreement, 
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this top-down approach of international negotiations under the UNFCCC thus has to be 
supplemented by a process of domestic consultations, preparations and actions on mit-
igation. The EU also endorsed this in their preparations for the negotiations under the 
ADP, and the BASIC countries also considered it important for the Warsaw Climate 
Conference to “encourage Parties to engage in domestic consultations and prepara-
tions, in the context of the ADP negotiations” (BASIC Ministerial Meeting 2013). In-
deed, the ADP negotiations in Warsaw resulted in a variety of decisions in which de-
veloped countries in particular are “urged” to take more voluntary action (UNFCCC 
2013b). 
Optimists could conclude that domestic climate policies are already thriving, simulta-
neously to the international climate regime, which is dominated by the North-South 
divide (see section 3.3; see also Hoffmann 2011). For example, Brazil made voluntary 
pledges to reduce its BAU emissions but declared that this type of commitment should 
not be seen as a parameter for other emerging economies (Kasa 2013; Viola 2013). 
South Africa wants to shift to a less carbon-intensive economy and stated that its emis-
sions will need to reach a peak no later than 2020–2025 and plateau before starting to 
drop (Winkler / Marquand 2009). The United States is another example. Its continues 
to maintain the position that developing countries should take on more responsibilities 
as they evolve, and hence it is calling for a more nuanced interpretation of CBDR and 
respective capabilities (Winkler / Rajamani 2013). Yet, President Obama formulated a 
GHG emission-reduction target of 17 per cent below 2005 levels by 2020 (Mehling / 
Frenkil 2013). This target does not look very ambitious: it brings the GHG emissions 
of the United States more or less back to the level at the start of the climate negotia-
tions in the 1990s. Yet China and India followed this announcement and, in different 
ways, came up with national carbon-intensity reduction pledges (Brunnée 2010). In 
addition, cities have come to the fore as prospective leaders of trans-national action on 
climate change (e.g. Bulkeley et al. 2011; Bulkeley / Schroeder 2012). 
Yet, even the most ardent optimists will concede that domestic action alone is hardly 
sufficient.17 It remains inconceivable to effectively limit global warming within the 
2°C margin without an international climate regime that frames and supports global 
efforts to achieve commensurate emission limitations and reductions. Building on the 
normative and political framing of the notion of CBDR, as provided in this chapter, the 
next chapter analyses how CBDR-related challenges have been dealt with in other in-
ternational regimes and policy arenas. Ultimately, the UNFCCC might benefit from the 
approaches as well as differentiation and participation mechanisms that are already 
guiding international cooperation across the North-South divide elsewhere. 
 
 
 
                                                            
17  Neither are they sufficiently obliging: as a case in point, Japan announced to amend its CO2 reduction 
target for 2020 from -25 per cent compared to 1990 levels to -3.8 per cent compared to 2005 levels in 
the midst of ongoing negotiations at COP 19 in Warsaw (IISD 2013b). 
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4 Other manifestations of common but differentiated responsibilities 
This section describes different manifestations of common but differentiated responsibili-
ties under different international regimes. Again, we begin by reviewing: 1) the specific 
context of CBDR; 2) obstacles to bringing CBDR into practice; 3) the (potential) mecha-
nisms to overcome those barriers, as proposed in the academic and public policy literature; 
and 4) the actual progress in overcoming barriers at the political level. 
Potential mechanisms to overcome barriers in the adoption and implementation of CBDR 
are shown in coloured tables, and again subdivided into the three categories introduced in 
section 3.1 (Tables 1–3), albeit with slightly different connotations: 
1. Approach: On which basis may CBDR be differentiated? 
2. Differentiation: How can responsibilities be differentiated? 
3. Participation mechanisms: How to ensure universal participation, that is, including 
parties with low development levels and limited capacities? 
The different manifestations described here do not easily lend themselves to a methodo-
logically rigorous comparison: they have different scopes and contexts, and the mecha-
nisms to overcome barriers in one manifestation can thus not be simply transplanted to the 
context of the UNFCCC. Yet, the synopsis of observable (or potential) institutional mech-
anisms provides useful cues: the UNFCCC regime complex is rooted in the wider institu-
tional context of the world economy and global environmental governance, and it may 
draw useful lessons from its institutional antecedents, neighbours and even younger sib-
lings. In any case, the negotiating states are the same across different international re-
gimes. Different international institutions invariably influence and shape each other over 
time, because no regime is constructed on a blank slate.18  
To this end, the remainder of this chapter considers altogether six specific examples, in 
which we find different (mostly implicit) manifestations of CBDR. The UNFCCC’s “sis-
ter conventions” are an obvious starting point: as with the UNFCCC, both the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the UNCCD were negotiated in the immediate context 
of the UNCED in 1992. In sections 4.1 and 4.2 we thus consider whether and how the 
principle of CBDR is reflected in these two convention processes. In section 4.3 we turn to 
the world trade regime and the operationalisation of “special and differential treatment” 
under GATT as governed through the WTO. Here, the conceptual label explicitly differs 
from CBDR, yet the underlying logic also addresses differences in developed countries 
and developing countries in view of multilateral trade policies. Section 4.4 reviews the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol, 
which are widely perceived as institutional role models for the UNFCCC regime. Section 
4.5 reviews ongoing negotiations on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions from so-called 
bunker fuels, which are closely linked to international climate negotiations. Here, the spe-
cific circumstances of maritime transport and aviation add another layer of complexity to 
                                                            
18  For theoretical foundations, refer to historical and sociological institutionalism, e.g. Braudel (1958), 
March and Olsen (1989), Pierson and Skocpol (2002), Thelen (2003), Steinmo (2008); applied to the 
UNFCCC, see also Depledge and Yamin (2009). 
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the differentiation between developed countries and developing countries and, for that 
matter, the attribution of emissions. Finally, section 4.6 considers the relevance of CBDR 
in the burgeoning negotiation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that follows 
from the 2012 “Rio+20” summit (the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Devel-
opment). The envisaged SDGs are supposed to be universally applicable, yet the envi-
sioned operational targets should be commensurate to different national and regional cir-
cumstances. 
4.1 Example 1: Convention on Biodiversity 
Apart from climate change, the loss of biodiversity is arguably the most pressing global 
environmental problem caused by human activities, with land-use change being its main 
driver (MEA 2005, 8). The global public good of biodiversity is threatened by ignorance 
of both its positive externalities – that is, third-party ramifications – and its private bene-
fits. When adopting the CBD, international policy-makers recognised that biodiversity 
requires an international effort for protection and took first steps to acknowledge the pri-
vate benefits of biodiversity with the concept of access and benefit-sharing (ABS). This 
specifically envisions a market-based system for regulating the conservation and the use 
of genetic resources. The ABS concept formally establishes a market for biodiversity by 
acknowledging its value for research and development and by requiring fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing. Today, the CBD, with 193 signatories, is still the key convention on bio-
diversity – despite the evolvement of many other biodiversity-related conventions and 
agreements (Rosendal / Schei 2012). 
Problem 
Generally speaking, most biodiversity is found in the southern hemisphere, particularly in 
developing countries. Yet, remaining and valuable parts of biodiversity are often under 
high pressure, with the greatest threat to biodiversity being human-induced destruction of 
habitats for the purpose of converting forest into agricultural land. Developing countries 
usually lack the capacity and financial resources to protect biodiversity. At the same time, 
most of these resources are being used and processed in the northern hemisphere, in indus-
trialised countries, which have already lost much of their biodiversity. The historical re-
sponsibility to finance biodiversity protection is with the industrialised countries, and so is 
the responsibility to share the benefits arising from its utilisation. According to the CBD, 
countries that still have biodiversity should go “as far as possible and as appropriate” 
and “in accordance with particular conditions and capabilities” to protect biodiversity 
(see e.g. CBD Articles 5–9). Developed countries have to support developing countries in 
their endeavours. However, the world’s political landscape has changed. Many developing 
countries have become middle-income countries. Accordingly, users of biodiversity (e.g. 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries) increasingly come from developing and 
middle-income countries. 
Differentiated responsibilities 
Even as CBDR is not explicitly comprised in the convention text of the CBD, it is implic-
itly acknowledged and manifested. The CBD’s preamble stipulates that the conservation 
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of biodiversity is a common concern of humankind, but it also reaffirms states’ sovereign 
rights over their own biological resources (UN 1992b; see also Kellersmann 2000). 
When it comes to differentiated responsibilities, the CBD draws a simple picture. Devel-
oping countries have to protect biodiversity, but developed countries have to pay for it. 
According to Article 20 on financial resources (UN 1992b): 
The developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial re-
sources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremen-
tal costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of this 
Convention and to benefit from its provisions […]. 
Furthermore: 
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their 
commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective implementation 
by developed country Parties of their commitments under this Convention relat-
ed to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into ac-
count the fact that economic and social development and eradication of poverty 
are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties. 
Apart from the financing issues, the CBDR logic can also be found in the establishment 
of a fair and equitable ABS system. ABS is a market-based approach that tries to allo-
cate an economic value to biodiversity based on its genetic properties and to facilitate 
the participation of developing countries in the benefits that arise from the commercial 
utilisation of biodiversity and genetic resources from their territory (e.g. pharmaceutical 
products based on plant genetic material). According to the CBD, monetary and non-
monetary benefits (e.g. joint research, technology transfer) should be shared with devel-
oping countries. 
Although ABS is an institutionalised mechanism under the CBD, developing countries 
have hardly benefited from it (Richerzhagen 2010). The negotiations on how to improve 
ABS under the CBD took more than six years (2004–2010) and culminated in the adop-
tion of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. 
Progress 
The way biodiversity is looked at internationally has changed. Whereas in 1992 biodi-
versity was the subject of concern, more emphasis is now put on the economic aspects 
of biodiversity (see e.g. TEEB 2011). The CBD appears to be a dynamic convention 
and has continuously been advanced at the biannual Conferences of the Parties. During 
COP 10 in Nagoya, agreements were reached on decisions with far-reaching conse-
quences. Countries negotiated the Nagoya Protocol on ABS, a new strategic plan for 
biodiversity protection (so-called Aichi targets) as well as a strategy for resource mo-
bilisation. The protocol will enter into force 90 days after the date of deposit of the 
50th instrument of ratification, but so far only 18 countries have ratified it. Notably, 
the convention’s 2010 Nagoya Protocol does not reiterate the CBD’s language, where-
by “biological diversity is a common concern of humankind,” but it explicitly recog-
nises “the interdependence of all countries with regard to genetic resources for food 
and agriculture” (Sands et al. 2012, 234). This expression emphasises the economic 
importance of biodiversity for well-being. 
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In contrast to the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol no longer distinguishes between developed and 
developing countries, but categorises countries as “user” and “provider” countries of biodi-
versity, implicitly acknowledging the recent shifts of economic development. The protocol 
furthermore differentiates between LDCs, SIDS and economies in transition. Tables 6 and 7 
present overviews of the differentiation and participation mechanisms under the CBD. 
Table 6: Differentiation mechanisms reflecting CBDR under the CBD 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
Differentiation19 Benefit-sharing  
(CBD Art. 15.7) 
UN (1992b) Industrialised states have to share the  
benefits arising from the commercial use 
and other utilisations of genetic resources 
with developing countries. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Table 7: Participation mechanisms reflecting CBDR under the CBD 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
Facilitate access 
and transfer of 
technology (CBD 
Art. 16) 
Kellersmann 
(2000) 
Industrialised states have to facilitate the access and the 
transfer of technologies necessary for the preservation, 
the sustainable use, as well as the utilisation of ad-
vantages of biotechnology. 
Financial support 
(CBD Art. 20/21) 
Kellersmann 
(2000) 
Industrialised states have to transfer financial resources 
in order to cover incremental costs, which developing 
countries incur in order to fulfil their obligations under 
the agreement. 
Exchange of  
information /  
technical and scien-
tific cooperation  
(CBD Art. 17/18) 
UN (1992b) Industrialised states should facilitate the exchange of 
information relevant to the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity and promote technical and scientific 
cooperation with developing countries. 
Research 
/emergencies  
(Nagoya Protocol 
Art. 8) 
UN (2011) Industrialised states should promote research and access 
to treatment by developing countries. 
Capacity / financial 
resources (Nagoya 
Protocol Art. 22/25) 
UN (2011) Industrialised states should support capacity-building, 
capacity development and strengthening of human  
resources and institutional capacities to effectively  
implement the protocol in developing country, LDCs, 
SIDS and economies in transition. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
                                                            
19  One could argue that this is a compliance mechanism. In this report it is considered “differentiation”, as 
it is not a mechanism where resources, technology or knowledge is transferred from industrialised states 
to developing countries to help them comply, but a mechanism that causes differentiation when it comes 
to benefit-sharing. Developing countries could also benefit from commercial and other (domestic) 
utilisation of genetic resources, but they do not have the obligation to share this with industrialised 
countries. 
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4.2 Example 2: UN Convention to Combat Desertification 
Not adopted at UNCED, but negotiated as a result of it, the UNCCD reflects the “spirit of 
Rio” like no other comparable document, both in style and in substance (see Bruyninckx 
2006). Indeed, it is often even referred to as a sustainable development convention rather 
than as an environmental treaty. As one consequence, the dichotomy between developed 
countries and developing countries has been particularly pronounced from the outset, no-
tably where the implementation of the convention is concerned. At the same time, the 
UNCCD’s explicit distinction of “affected country Parties” (see UNCCD 1994, Art. 1) 
does not exclusively relate to developing countries in the context of desertification, dry-
land degradation and drought, but also relates to developed countries, including, for in-
stance, large OECD countries such as Australia, Spain and the United States. 
Problem 
The relevance of CBDR should be self-evident for the UNCCD, and the notion is implicit-
ly visible throughout the UNCCD, but it is rarely referred to as an explicit concern in the 
implementation of the convention. It merely translates into an explicitly asymmetrical at-
tribution of state obligations along the traditional developing / developed country fault 
line. This has originally been interpreted as an exceptionally strong showing of bargaining 
power by the “Southern collective”, as represented by the G77 (Najam 2004). 
As with both the CBD and the UNFCCC, the UNCCD asserts the protection of a global 
public good even as it ultimately needs to be provided at a national or local scale. There-
fore, and unlike the CBD and UNFCCC, the globality of dryland degradation is not as 
straightforward as in the cases of biodiversity loss and climate change. Hence, and in spite 
of the convention’s universal membership, the global scope of the UNCCD has always 
been contested (Bauer 2007). As a result, an operational application of CBDR to the im-
plementation of the UNCCD becomes much more complicated upon second glance. 
Differentiated responsibilities 
Article 4 of the convention specifically underscores the general obligations – and thereby, 
as it were, common responsibilities of all parties – while singling out affected developing 
country parties as “eligible for assistance” (UNCCD 1994, Art. 4.3). Articles 5 and 6 
spell out further obligations of any affected country parties and developed country parties, 
respectively. At the same time, the explicit prioritisation of the African region in the con-
vention title (“...particularly in Africa”) and in Article 7 (“Priority for Africa”) as well as 
the UNCCD’s particular “Regional Annexes” could in themselves be interpreted as an 
expression of differentiated responsibilities. 
Still, the UNCCD “only mirrors the concept of CBDR to a very low degree” (Kellersmann 
2000). This is ironic, as the emphasis on the African region as well as the regional annexes 
strongly reinforce the notion that desertification manifests differently in different places. 
This would logically require different parties to accept different responsibilities in address-
ing the problem, at least in theory. In practice, however, the implementation of the UNCCD 
largely depends on existing frameworks and means of official development assistance. Ar-
guably, a possible differentiation of dryland-specific responsibilities is thus prevented by the 
conventional logic of North-South transfers and the contested globality of “desertification”. 
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Progress 
Generally speaking, progress in implementing the UNCCD has been cumbersome and 
tenacious from the outset (see Toulmin 2006; Stringer 2008). With a view to the principle 
of CBDR, and in light of the above, it would seem that the UNCCD is an obvious candi-
date to experiment with the principle’s practical implementation, but parties have either 
failed to recognise this or purposefully avoided it for the sake of familiar patterns of 
North-South bargaining. For the time being, no progress is thus discernible in how CBDR 
may inform – or even guide – further negotiations under the UNCCD, let alone its imple-
mentation. As it were, the normative potential of CBDR is hardly employed under the 
UNCCD, in spite of its strong “Rio” rhetoric. Although it is conceivable to push for a 
stronger reflection of CBDR on the agenda of UNCCD negotiations – for instance, where 
technology transfer is concerned – this does not seem likely. Respective proposals might 
effectively equal a call to renegotiate the convention as such. 
With a view to financial responsibilities, it can be argued that granting UNCCD-related 
projects eligibility for funding through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was a 
significant concession of developed countries to the advocates of the UNCCD in develop-
ing countries and within the United Nations (UN) system. By eventually expanding the 
GEF’s portfolio with an operational programme on land degradation, donor countries ef-
fectively acknowledged land degradation to be of global concern and addressed, at least 
indirectly, the perceived gap in funding for the implementation of the UNCCD. African 
countries in particular, as well as the UNCCD Secretariat, had pushed for this, ever since 
the GEF was first established in 1994 (Bauer 2009). 
Table 8: Differentiation mechanisms reflecting CBDR under the UNCCD 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
Eligibility for 
assistance 
(UNCCD Art. 4.3) 
UNCCD (1994) The convention distinguishes developed country parties 
from developing country parties as well as between  
affected (i.e. by desertification) country parties and  
non-affected country parties. Parties that are both affected 
countries and developing countries “are eligible for  
assistance in the implementation of the Convention.” 
Differentiated 
obligations 
(UNCCD Art. 5 
and 6) 
UNCCD (1994) The convention specifies distinct obligations for affected 
country parties under Article 5 (e.g. “give due priority to 
combating desertification and mitigating the effects of 
drought”) and for developed country parties under Article 
6 (e.g. “actively support [...] the efforts of affected  
country parties”; “provide substantial financial resources 
and other forms of support”). 
Regional  
differentiation 
(UNCCD Art. 7 
and Regional 
Annexes) 
UNCCD (1994) The convention explicitly singles out Africa as a priority 
region (UNCCD Art. 7) and furthermore entails five re-
gional annexes that specify the “particular conditions” for 
the regions of I. Africa; II. Asia; III. Latin America and 
the Caribbean; IV. Northern Mediterranean; and  
V. Central and Eastern Europe, and spells out regional 
needs and guidelines for the respective affected country 
parties. 
Source: Authors’ compilation  
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Table 9: Participation mechanisms reflecting CBDR under the UNCCD 
Mechanism Described by Explanation 
Financial support Kellersmann 
(2000);  
Falloux, Tressler 
and Mayrand 
(2006);  
Bauer (2009) 
Developed country parties “are legally obliged to make  
significant financial assets available for the purposes of  
compliance assistance” (Kellersmann 2000). However, no 
criterion is provided in order to more specifically determine 
the extent of this obligation. The UNCCD’s own Global 
Mechanism is in itself not a financing mechanism, but  
“instead designed to mobilise, channel, and coordinate fi-
nancial flows” (Falloux / Tressler / Mayrand 2006) according 
to the convention’s needs. Yet, expanding the portfolio of the 
GEF to include an operational programme on land  
degradation can be interpreted as a concession of donor  
countries vis-à-vis the UNCCD (Bauer 2009). 
Technology  
transfer 
Kellersmann (2000) Industrialised states are obliged to transfer technologies that 
support combating desertification. However, in contrast to 
other provisions, this obligation does not require parties to 
take “all practicable steps”. 
Promote technical 
and scientific 
cooperation 
Bauer and Stringer 
(2009);  
Grainger (2009) 
Article 17 of the convention calls for the promotion of  
technical and scientific cooperation in the fields of combating 
desertification and mitigating the effects of drought  
“according to parties’ ‘respective capabilities’ ”. Indeed, a 
huge body of international scientific expertise could help to 
operationalise the UNCCD’s normative provisions for  
on-the-ground implementation. However, the institutional 
interface between the political convention process and the 
scientific community is inadequate to harness this potential. 
Implementation of 
regional annexes 
UNCCD (1994) Regional annexes specify different regional contexts in 
fighting dryland degradation and desertification. Theses  
annexes could provide a basis to reflect CBDR within the 
regions as well as between the regional and the international 
levels (multilevel governance). 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
4.3 Example 3: GATT and the World Trade Organization 
The notion of CBDR can also be detected outside the environmental realm. The WTO 
agreements include numerous provisions that grant developing countries special bene-
fits, technical assistance, longer transition periods and/or less stringent obligations.20 
The example of these WTO provisions for special and differential treatment (SDT) for 
developing countries can be singled out as exhibiting a significant normative overlap 
with CBDR under the UNFCCC and is therefore also included in this subsection. Both 
the climate change and trade regimes explicitly acknowledge differences in capacity 
and development needs and relate them to the obligations of their constituents, that is, 
member states. 
                                                            
20  See also Keck and Low (2004), Hoekman (2005) and Pauwelyn (2013).  
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In the WTO, the challenge is not one of fairly allocating the burden of mitigation and 
adaptation costs or commitments, but of “levelling the playing field to ensure fair 
competition and an equitable distribution of the short-term costs of trade liberalisa-
tion” (e.g. Torres 2012). For instance, the act of opening markets generates adjustment 
costs, as resources move from one sector to another, which has particularly harsh im-
pacts in developing countries, and therefore special rules for them are justified (Brandi 
2010, 207). 
In the beginning, the multilateral trading system put countries on comparatively equal 
footing, in terms of the obligations, and foresaw only very few exceptions. In 1964, a 
new amendment on trade and development to GATT 1947 included non-reciprocity 
and special provisions for less-developed countries and, in 1979, the adoption of the 
so-called Enabling Clause, which allowed for differential and more favourable treat-
ment of developing countries in a number of ways (see also Table 9). In 1994, the 
newly adopted Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (“the WTO 
Agreement”) incorporated the principle of “single undertaking” into the multilateral 
trading system, which implied the end of an opt-out option: all WTO members had to 
accept all agreements, which generated a number of new commitments for developing 
countries. Yet, the 1994 WTO Agreement also includes numerous special provisions 
for developing countries. The chapeau of the WTO Agreement cites sustainable eco-
nomic development as one of the objectives of the WTO and specifies that internation-
al trade should benefit the economic development of developing and least-developed 
countries. 
There are important similarities between the UNFCCC and the WTO. International 
trade and climate change are the two single issue areas that have major implications 
for quite broad areas of the economies of the involved parties. The stakes in both issue 
areas are very high, potential costs of compliance are very high and an endless number 
of many different kinds of interest groups are involved. At the same time, there are key 
differences between the trade and the climate realm. 
Firstly, the starting idea of the WTO has always been trade without discrimination 
(and thus without differentiation). Non-discrimination means that WTO member coun-
tries must not discriminate between their trading partners nor between imported and 
local goods once the former have entered the domestic market. In the WTO, non-
discrimination is thus the rule, with limited exceptions for differentiation. One could 
argue that this occurs the other way around in the climate regime. 
Secondly, at least to some extent, special and differential treatment for developing 
countries can be enforced on the basis of the WTO Dispute Settlement system. So far, 
only the famous “US Shrimp-turtle” case has explicitly referred to the CBDR princi-
ple, whereas other cases discuss differentiation between countries based on their “ca-
pabilities” and do not really look at the “responsibility” side of the equation (Gupta / 
Sanchez 2012, 6).21 For instance, the WTO panel has stated that it will accept “the 
                                                            
21  Most of these cases focus on rapidly developing countries and emerging markets rather than poorer 
developing countries. The “Shrimp-turtle” case, brought by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand 
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need of developing countries to promote their industry in acquiring a share of the in-
ternational market,” but it views such “differentiation as temporary and dynamic and 
needing to respond to changing developing country circumstances” (Gupta / Sanchez 
2012, 6, 17). 
Some commentators argue that another difference in the case of trade lies in the lim-
ited applicability of the argument, whereby “developed countries have a moral re-
sponsibility to pay a disproportionate share of the costs of collective action” and “take 
the lead on account of past actions” (Eckersley 2009, 13). From that perspective, “the 
climate regime provides a stronger challenge than the trade regime to the traditional 
principles of liberal contractualism, grounded in reciprocity, that formally underpin 
international treaty-making” (Eckersley 2009, 13). Yet, one might also make the case 
that, in the context of the WTO, developed countries also have a moral responsibility 
to shoulder a substantial, if not “disproportionate”, part of the costs of collective action 
(Brandi 2010). The latter position could, for example, be defended on the basis of the 
argument that developed countries benefit disproportionately, or that developing coun-
tries face higher adjustment or implementation costs on the basis of a partial historical 
responsibility for the current situation, for example against the background of coloni-
sation, etc. 
Problem 
The implications of SDT for developing countries remain contested. Some critics con-
tinue to question its rationale and practical effectiveness in supporting development 
(cf. Mitchell / Voon 2009). For instance, some development economists are wary of 
certain special and differential treatment provisions, including trade preferences, and 
argue in favour of non-discriminatory market access (e.g. Hoekman 2005).  
At the same time, the preferential market access granted to developing countries has so 
far been much less effective than expected because of the way in which it has been 
implemented. For example, preferences for the goods for which developing countries 
have a comparative advantage have often been limited or exclude items of interest to 
developing countries. Moreover, one of the major drawbacks of preferences is that 
they are uncertain. They are unpredictable due to frequent renewals or arbitrary condi-
tions for eligibility and subject to unilateral change or withdrawal and to conditionality 
(Özden / Reinhardt 2003). In addition, exporters in developing countries find the 
transaction costs of the certification process too heavy in relation to the saved prefer-
ential margin (Mattoo / Subramanian 2004). Finally, many developing countries are 
unable to comply with rigorous rules of origin, which may be so strict that countries 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
against the United States, deals with the question whether the use of specific fishing nets can be 
required by the United States in order to protect the turtle species. In its final ruling (1998), the 
Panel recognised the need to protect the turtles but saw the US measures as unilateral, arbitrary 
and unjustifiable, and called for greater cooperation between the United States and the other states 
in order to find ways to protect the turtles – thus recognising that there were common but differen-
tiated responsibilities in protecting them (Gupta / Sanchez 2012, 15f.). 
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are forced to pay the “normal” most-favoured-nation tariff because they cannot satisfy 
the relevant requirements (Brenton 2003).22  
Differentiated responsibilities 
In the WTO, countries are distinguished in terms of whether they belong to the group of 
developed countries or the group of developing countries; the latter also encompasses 
the group of LDCs.23 As mentioned above, the Enabling Clause of GATT gives developed 
countries the legal right to provide SDT to developing countries in terms of trade policy 
(see Table 10 below). However, the Enabling Clause does not allow for more fine-grained 
differentiation, as it requires that all developing countries be treated the same way in terms 
of market access; the exception are LDCs under the UN definition, which may be entitled 
to additional benefits.  
One major problem is that the right to make use of SDT is based on a country’s own self-
assessment rather than on some sort of quantifiable criteria. In contrast to the list of Non-
Annex I (developing) parties in the UNFCCC, the WTO does not have an official list of 
developing countries (Pauwelyn 2013). Any member can claim to be a “developing coun-
try” and remain at that stage, which automatically entitles them to the benefits of SDT.24 
Since there are no graduation criteria for SDT, unsurprisingly, no developing country has 
ever felt the urge to give up its advantages (Torres 2012). 
However, least-developed countries are automatically growing outside the LDC category 
and lose their additional preferential treatment in the WTO as soon as their per capita in-
come surpasses a certain threshold (Torres 2012). 
Since no country has ever graduated from the group of “developing countries” in the 
WTO, this grouping has become increasingly heterogeneous over the years. The greater 
diversity of the group of developing countries is one of the major obstacles to faster pro-
gress in the Doha Round (e.g. Brandi / Helble 2011). As developing countries in former 
GATT times used to have small markets, developed countries did not hesitate to offer 
them a free ride on their market liberalisation. In the meantime, however, some poorer 
WTO members have grown so substantially that their markets are considered to be too 
large for free-riding, and developed countries hesitate to offer them market access without 
receiving reciprocal market-access concessions in return – which, in turn, makes it more 
difficult to come to an agreement between these member states. 
 
                                                            
22  Rules of origin are used to determine the country of origin of a product for purposes of interna-
tional trade. In the case of trade preferences, the rules of origin determine what products can bene-
fit from the preference at stake. For many poorer exporters, in practice, many rules of origin are 
defined such that they can hardly be attained, demanding, for instance, that half or more of the 
value of the product must be locally produced. 
23  The WTO Agreements also include special phase-in periods for economies in transition (Pauwelyn 
2013). 
24  Currently, the WTO has 160 members, of which fewer than a quarter are developed countries. 
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Table 10: Examples of differentiation mechanisms reflecting special and differential treatment 
under the WTO 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
Non-reciprocity / 
Reduced levels of 
reduction  
commitments 
GATT Part IV 
(1964) 
Part IV of GATT includes provisions on the concept of 
non-reciprocal preferential treatment for developing 
countries – when developed countries grant trade  
concessions to developing countries, they should not 
expect the developing countries to make matching offers 
in return. 
However, many developing countries claim that this has 
little practical value, as it does not contain any  
obligations for developed countries. 
More favourable 
treatment 
GATT Enabling 
Clause (1979) 
The Enabling Clause (officially called the “Decision on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment,  
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries”), adopted under GATT in 1979, enables 
developed member states to give differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries (e.g.  
discriminatory tariff schemes to favour imports from 
developing countries). 
Proposal: Special 
and differential 
treatment for an 
“LDC+” group 
e.g. Hoekman, 
Michalopoulos and 
Winters (2003) 
Some experts propose that an “LDC+” group of small 
and poor developing countries, determined by size and 
per capita criteria, should by and large capture those 
countries in real need of SDT across all WTO  
agreements. 
Proposal:  
“Characteristic-
based approach” / 
Situational ap-
proach to special 
and differential 
treatment / Implic-
it threshold ap-
proach 
e.g. ICTSD (2007); 
Corrales-Leal, 
Baritto and Mohan 
(2007);  
Stevens (2002) 
According to the proposal, any WTO member whose 
share of world trade is below certain specified thresholds 
would be allowed to access a special set of rules.  
In the context of the Doha negotiations, such a proposal 
gained relatively wide support from the WTO 
membership. The approach represents one of the first 
times that the WTO membership has supported  
triggering SDT through the satisfaction of a measurable 
requirement, rather than targeting special and differential 
treatment at the traditional categories of developed, 
developing or LDC member.  
Proposal: Assis-
tance on the basis 
of needs  
assessments 
 
e.g. Wang and 
Winters (2000); 
Prowse (2002) 
Wang and Winters (2000) and Prowse (2002) propose 
SDT involving an assessment of the costs and the  
capacities of countries to implement WTO agreements, 
on the basis of which a time interval would be  
determined during which the country is exempted from 
the rules, and a tailor-made programme of technical 
assistance and capacity-building is provided by a broad 
range of relevant donors. 
Others argue that assistance and capacity-building 
should complement special and differential treatment, 
but that it cannot substitute for a set of legally  
enforceable provisions (Keck / Low 2004) 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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Table 11: Examples of participation mechanisms reflecting special and differential treatment 
under the WTO 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
Longer  
transition  
periods 
e.g. Keck and Low 
(2004) 
A number of WTO rules offer longer transition periods, 
especially for LDCs, to provide developing countries with 
more time to implement and adapt to new trade rules. 
Technical  
assistance,  
Aid for Trade 
e.g. WTO (2006); 
OECD and WTO 
(2009) 
Many WTO agreements provide for technical assistance 
to developing countries. 
The WTO Aid for Trade initiative was launched at the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005 
and includes five categories: support for trade policy and 
trade regulation; trade development; trade-related  
infrastructure; productive capacities; and trade-related 
adjustment. 
Privileged  
market access  
e.g. GATT  
Enabling Clause 
(1979) 
Rich countries and some emerging powers offer poorer 
developing countries preferential (i.e. more favourable) 
market access arrangements intended to create  
opportunities for jobs, exports and investment. For  
example, under the EU’s Everything But Arms initiative, 
all imports to the EU from LDCs are duty free and quota 
free, with the exception of arms. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Progress in the implementation of special and differential treatment 
In 2001, member governments agreed that all SDT provisions should be reviewed with a 
view to strengthening them in the context of the WTO Doha Round negotiations. More 
specifically, the aim is to identify which SDT provisions are mandatory, to consider the 
legal and practical implications of making mandatory those which are currently non-
binding, and to explore ways in which developing countries, particularly the LDCs, may 
be assisted to make best use of SDT.  
It is without question that SDT alone cannot resolve the challenges at the intersection of 
trade and development. Still, in the context of the recently revived Doha Round, members 
should seek to agree on more concrete SDT provisions than are at present contained in the 
WTO agreements. Ideally, making progress should be based on careful economic analysis 
to make out quantifiable criteria for offering SDT to particular countries under specific 
circumstances (Mitchell / Voon 2009). 
4.4 Example 4: Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
The international acknowledgement of the global problem of ozone layer depletion through 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol that 
followed as a response have strongly influenced the emerging political dynamics of climate 
change and its regime design (Depledge / Yamin 2009). Scholarship often examines lessons 
that could be drawn from the successful international negotiations and policies of the interna-
tional ozone regime with regard to international climate change negotiations (see e.g. Barrett 
2003; Smith 2010; UNEP 2009; Zang 2009). While it is acknowledged that the context for the 
ozone and climate regimes are fundamentally different, and that the scope of economic activi-
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ties concerned and the amount of financing needed is much higher in the case of climate 
change, the experience of the Montreal Protocol is still instructive (see e.g. UNEP 2009). 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol 
do not use the wording of CBDR. They were adopted in 1985 and 1987, respectively, that 
is, before CBDR ermerged as an explicit concept in international law. However, Article 5 
(“special situation of developing countries”) does include special rights for developing 
countries whose annual calculated level of consumption of listed controlled substances is 
less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into force of the protocol (UNEP 
2000). From 1992 onwards, following the adoption of the Rio Declaration, the UNFCCC 
and the formulation of CBDR, meetings of the parties to the Montreal Protocol have often 
referred to the principle as a way to express the differentiation put in place in the treaty 
(Deleuil 2012). 
Indeed, developing countries have successfully pressed for the establishment of a special 
fund to help them implement the Montreal Protocol, arguably demonstrating an increased 
bargaining power of the “global South” in the environmental realm (Sell 1996; Biermann 
1998). What is more, the fund proved a major key to the successful implementation of the 
protocol and thereby demonstrated the utility of acknowledging different capabilities and, 
indeed, addressing them through an unprecedented willingness of major developed coun-
try parties to invest in the technical and financial capacities of developing countries (Wet-
testad 2002; Bauer 2009). Accordingly, negotiations under the Montreal Protocol have 
often referred to CBDR as a guiding principle once it was established in the Rio Declara-
tion and the UNFCCC (Deleuil 2012). 
Problem 
Initially, only 24 countries and the European Commission signed the Montreal Protocol in 
1987; including virtually all developed countries. These countries accounted for the vast ma-
jority of global production of CFCs (see Figure 6), but they did not include many of the major 
developing countries with rapidly emerging economies, such as India and China (Smith 2010). 
These two countries refused to participate in the Montreal Protocol until a fund was estab-
lished to help developing countries find and implement alternatives to CFCs. Even then, 
North-South differences were perceived as the main obstacle to “smooth sailing” regarding 
the otherwise remarkably effective implementation of the Montreal Protocol (Wettestad 2002). 
Differentiated responsibilities 
Table 12: Mechanisms reflecting CBDR in the Montreal Protocol and its amendments 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
A
pp
ro
ac
h Finish facilities 
under  
construction25 
Honkonen 
(2009) 
Parties not falling under the developing countries, but with 
CFC plants under construction, were allowed to finish these. 
Additional production from such facilities was allowed to count 
as part of 1986 production and consumption. This concession 
was included for countries with economies in transition. 
Source: Authors’ compilation  
                                                            
25  This allowance is labelled as an “approach”, as it deals with the way in which industrial plants are 
treated even before responsibilities are differentiated among different countries. 
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Table 13: Differentiation mechanisms in the Montreal Protocol 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
No voluntary 
undertakings vs. 
mandatory 
commitments 
Smith (2010) Developing countries were given an additional 10 years to 
meet their commitments, but there was no “invidious”  
distinction between some countries’ undertakings being 
voluntary, while others had mandatory commitments. This 
has minimised the tension between developing and  
developed countries. 
Different base 
years for  
countries and 
substances26 
Honkonen (2009) Countries had different base years determining the  
phase-out commitments: industrialised countries had 1986, 
whereas developing countries were allowed to use the  
average of its annual calculated level of consumption for 
the period 1995–1997 for certain controlled substances, and 
the average of its calculated level of consumption for the 
period 1998–2000. 
Grace period  Davidson Ladly 
(2012) 
Article 5, paragraph 1 provides delayed compliance for 
developing countries if a country’s per capita consumption 
of certain controlled substances was below a threshold  
(a proxy for economic development). The 10-year grace 
period that was arranged made it possible to require  
developing countries to meet the same obligations as  
developed countries. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Table 14: Participation mechanisms in the Montreal Protocol 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
Satisfy basic 
domestic needs 
Honkonen  
(2009) 
Article 5 parties were allowed to exceed most production 
restrictions and prohibition, by no more than 10 per cent, 
in order to satisfy the “basic domestic needs” of develop-
ing countries, or for the purposes of “industrial rationali-
zation between Parties”. The former term caused consid-
erable debate, as some countries also considered export 
as a basic domestic need. In 1989 it was decided that 
developing countries were not allowed to export ozone-
depleting substances if they wanted to continue to benefit 
from the 10-year grace period.  
Critical use 
exemptions 
Honkonen  
(2009) 
Many of the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out regulations 
allowed for the continued production and consumption of 
the controlled substances for certain “essential” uses, for 
example, necessary for health, safety, or critical for the 
functioning of society, with no technically and  
economically feasible alternatives or substitutes that are 
acceptable from the standpoint of environment and health. 
This loophole has, however, not been broadly applied. 
                                                            
26  This mechanism was labelled under “differentiation” because of its different treatment of different 
CFCs. 
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The Montreal Protocol is now considered a landmark in global environmental negotiations 
that has successfully reduced the global production, consumption and emissions of ozone-
depleting substances (Velders et al. 2007; Smith 2010). It is also an early and significant 
example of how the principle of CBDR may be operationalised (Davidson Ladly 2012) 
(see also Figure 6). 
4.5 Example 5: Bunker fuel emission control in shipping 
The Kyoto Protocol identified the need to regulate CO2 emissions from bunker fuels, yet 
international aviation and shipping are not included in the protocol because countries 
could not agree on where to allocate their emission.27 Therefore, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were tasked to 
devise a strategy to reduce international emissions resulting from the combustion of their 
so-called bunker fuels. This is significant for global climate policy because emissions 
from international aviation and shipping are the fastest-growing source of global green-
house gas emissions.28 There is broad-based consensus among developed and developing 
countries as well as industries that bunker fuel emissions must be controlled – the issue is 
the approach (Project Catalyst 2009; UNFCCC 2012a; Government of Cyprus / EC 2012). 
This example contrasts with the other examples in this subsection, as it deals with climate 
change directly, and its international negotiations have started more recently. This discus-
sion paper discusses bunker fuel emission control in shipping rather than aviation, as the 
IMO is ahead of ICAO29 in its development of a global market-based mechanism that re-
duces emissions and takes the notion of CBDR on board. 
Progress is said to have been too slow (see e.g. T&E 2009), but from 2013 onwards, IMO 
implemented mandatory measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international 
shipping for all ships, representing the first-ever mandatory global greenhouse gas reduction 
regime for an international industry sector (IMO 2011b). Yet, the technical and operational 
measures included in the so-called MARPOL (International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships) amendments are not sufficient to meet the overall reduction objec-
tives indicated by scientific research, and IMO therefore concluded that a global market-
based measure (MBM) is also needed to reduce emissions from shipping (IMO 2011a). 
Problem 
Yet there are conflicting views among IMO member states on the interpretation of 
CBDR within this MBM, and its precedence over – or subordination to – IMO’s princi-
ple of equal treatment of ships has caused a deadlock in the discussions on how to meet 
                                                            
27  Bunker fuels are technically any type of fuel used aboard ships. Its name comes from the containers 
used to store fuel onboard or in ports. The name subsequently came to be applied to aviation fuel as 
well (T&E 2009). 
28  According to Project Catalyst (2009), the emissions from aviation and shipping are estimated at about 
2.5 gigatons per year by 2020, that is, as much as the emissions of the entire Middle East. 
29  In October 2013, ICAO agreed to develop by 2016 a global market-based mechanism that addresses 
international aviation emissions and apply it by 2020. Until then countries or groups of countries, such 
as the EU (see section 3.3.4), can implement interim measures. 
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the UNFCCC’s request for measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from interna-
tional shipping (Project Catalyst 2009; Kågeson 2011). The recently formed group of 
“like-minded developing countries”30 wants the IMO to work in accordance with the 
principles and provisions of the UNFCCC, in particular the principles of equity and 
CBDR (UNFCCC 2012a). However, the EU wants measures that are consistent with the 
customary practices and principles of IMO (Government of Cyprus / EC 2012). 
The International Chamber of Shipping prefers the IMO to implement a mechanism 
that includes the entire world. Although global coverage is necessary, developing 
countries are concerned that an unfair burden will be placed on their economies (Pro-
ject Catalyst 2009; Kågeson 2011). This is a complex issue. About 60 per cent of glob-
al trade in shipping is destined for developed economies, yet only 35 per cent of the 
global fleet is registered with “Annex I” nations (Project Catalyst 2009). A system 
which would exclude Non-Annex I countries would cause carbon leakage, as ships are 
flexible about their flag of choice (Bennett 2012). 
Differentiated responsibilities 
Table 15: Approaches to attribute emissions in the reduction of emissions from bunker fuels in 
shipping 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
A
pp
ro
ac
h3
1  
Port state levy IMO (2010a) All countries would be authorised to allow their ports to levy a 
globally uniform emissions charge on all vessels calling at their 
ports. Charges would be higher for heavier and dirtier fuels and 
lower for cleaner fuels, and structured in such a way to achieve 
the global reduction targets for greenhouse gases 
Levy on  
marine  
bunkers 
IMO (2010b) GHG fund contributions are collected on marine bunkers. A 
part thereof is refunded to ships meeting or exceeding agreed 
efficiency benchmarks and labelled as “good performance 
ships”. 
Reward or 
penalise ships 
based on ener-
gy efficiency 
e.g. IMO 
(2010c; 2010d) 
This subjects existing and new ships to mandatory  
energy-efficiency standards. Vessels would have to be judged 
against increasingly stringent efficiency standards, possibly 
with fees for non-compliance. 
Global emis-
sion cap and 
trade system 
e.g. IMO 
(2010e; 2010f; 
2010g) 
This sets a sector-wide cap on net emissions from international 
shipping. A reduced number of allowances (emission units) 
would be released into the market each year via a global auc-
tioning process. Units would be tradable. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
  
                                                            
30  The first meeting of the group on climate change was hosted by China in 2012. The document that is 
referred to was drafted by Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salva-
dor, India, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay and Vene-
zuela. 
31  IMO provides an overview of approaches proposed by individual countries: http://www.imo.org/ 
OurWork/Environment/pollutionprevention/airpollution/pages/market-based-measures.aspx. 
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Table 16: Differentiation mechanisms reflecting CBDR in bunker fuel emission control   
in shipping 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
Slower  
phasing-in 
Kågeson (2011) A slower phasing-in of regulations for developing countries, 
for example in terms of targets and timeframes for developed 
and developing nations. The duration of the envisaged  
compensation rules is a main issue: some Non-Annex I  
countries have already passed certain Annex I countries in 
terms of GDP per capita and/or emissions per capita. 
Only cover 
journeys to 
developed 
countries 
Romani and 
Stern (2013) 
This could be done with or without compensating developing 
countries. 
Exception of 
specific routes 
Kågeson (2011) This would grant further allowances to particular LDCs and 
SIDS. These routes should be subject to a review system; and 
it should be possible to add or remove routes through a  
petition mechanism.  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Table 17: Participation mechanisms reflecting CBDR under the CBD in bunker fuel emission 
control in shipping 
 Mechanism Described by Explanation 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 
Critical use 
exemptions 
Kågeson (2011) For essential items such as food or medicine, allowances 
could be granted for particular LDCs and SIDS through one‐
off shipments. These items should be subject to a review 
system, and it should be possible to add or remove items 
through a petition mechanism. 
Financial 
compensation 
Bennett (2012); 
Kågeson (2011); 
Romani and 
Stern (2013) 
Industry would support directing those funds that are raised 
through any of the above approaches to help climate change 
projects in developing nations, possibly with linkages to the 
UNFCCC “Green Climate Fund”. According to the Interna-
tional Chamber of Shipping, this approach is preferred by 
ship owners. The incidence of taxes used to mobilise funds 
should be limited to developed countries; if there is an impact 
on developing countries it should be compensated (no net 
incidence). 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Progress in the implementation of MBM 
In a note to COP 18 in Doha, the IMO stated that MBM proposals under review range 
from a contribution or levy on all CO2 emissions from international shipping – or only 
from those ships that do not meet the Energy-Efficiency Design Index requirement, via 
emissions trading systems – to schemes based on a ship’s actual efficiency, both by design 
(Energy-Efficiency Design Index) and operation (Ship Energy-Efficiency Management 
Plan) (IMO 2012). 
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In 2012 IMO decided on the need to undertake an impact assessment of the MBM pro-
posals with a focus on possible impacts on consumers and industries in developing coun-
tries, particularly in LDCs, SIDS and remotely located developing countries with long 
trading distances. It will consider in detail the methodology and criteria this should be 
based on (IMO 2012). The 65th meeting of IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Com-
mittee (MEPC) adopted the Resolution on Promotion of Technical Co-operation and 
Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships. 
Among other things, this resolution “requests the Organization [...] to enable cooperation 
in the transfer of energy efficient technologies to developing countries in particular; and 
further assist in the sourcing of funding for capacity building and support to States, in 
particular developing States, which have requested technology transfer” (IMO 2013). 
However, discussions on MBMs were held back and suspended to a future session. Ac-
cording to the International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme (IMERS 2013), the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee discussions once again demonstrated the polit-
ical sensitivity of – and opposing views on – how to relate IMO’s climate change 
measures to the CBDR principle of the UNFCCC. 
4.6 Post-2015 negotiations and prospective Sustainable Development Goals 
2015 will be a pivotal year in setting the course for environmental and development policy 
until 2025 or 2030. A process to formulate new development goals in 2015 to succeed the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been set up in the context of the UN. 
Initially, this process was split into two strands. The first strand ties in with the MDGs and 
focuses on transforming the current development agenda into a post-MDG agenda with a 
view to removing its weaknesses but maintaining its strengths. Five work streams (UN 
Task Team, UN Global Compact, High-level Panel of Eminent Persons, the Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network and the UN Development Group) were initiated by 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in order to produce reports and inputs for the Special 
Event on the MDGs that took place in New York in September 2013 (Rippin 2013). 
The second strand has emerged from Rio+2032 and aims at elaborating the SDGs. The idea 
is, first, to broaden the focus of the agenda from human to sustainable development and, 
second, to enlarge the scope of objectives from developing countries only to all countries. 
In a balanced way, the goals should address all three dimensions of sustainable develop-
ment (economic, social, environment) and be coherent with – and integrated into – the UN 
development agenda beyond 2015. The MDGs serve as a model of what international de-
velopment goals could look like, as they have helped to mobilise action and resources to-
wards a core set of development priorities. However, they have also been strongly criti-
cised, for example for being incomplete, superficial and unilateral (see Loewe 2012). Fur-
thermore, the MDGs were established before the implications of climate change were fully 
understood, and development is thus more challenging than anticipated at the time when 
those objectives were set (Romani / Stern 2013). The MDGs depict a relationship between 
donors and developing countries along the classical North-South line, but the SDGs 
                                                            
32  “Rio+20” is the short name for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in 
Rio de Janeiro in June 2012. It took place 20 years after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, where countries 
adopted inter alia the UNFCCC, the UNCCD and the CBD (see also section 2.1). 
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should become real global and universal goals. However, global goals have to be imple-
mented on the national level. Therefore, the issue of CBDR becomes very important when 
discussing how to differentiate national targets contributing to the overall goals. 
The role CBDR will play in the SDGs is not clear yet. At Rio+20 it was agreed that SDGs 
must be: action-oriented, concise, easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, 
global in nature and universally applicable to all countries while “taking into account dif-
ferent national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national pol-
icies and priorities” (TFWW 247, 46). During the conference, the negotiations on CBDR 
were quite intense. Member states discussed in two negotiating groups how the principle 
could be reflected in the Rio+20 outcome document. Apart from the reference to capaci-
ties and levels of development in the SDG section, the outcome document directly points 
to CBDR when affirming “the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment, including, inter alia, the principle of common but differentiated responsibili-
ties, as set out in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration” (TFWW 15, 2), and when linking up 
with the UNFCCC: “Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present 
and future generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (TFWW 191, 34). 
After Rio+20 the international community needed some time to set up the process to devel-
op SDGs. Since January 2013 the 30-member Open Working Group (OWG) of the General 
Assembly has been meeting regularly to discuss conceptual and content-related issues. They 
have the mandate to prepare a proposal on the SDGs by September 2014. In the following 
meetings of the OWG (e.g. in the seventh meeting on cities, settlements, transport, produc-
tion and consumption, climate change and disaster risk reduction), CBDR has also been 
addressed, although it was not explicitly on the agenda. During the second session of the 
OWG (February 2013) on conceptual aspects of SDGs, it was discussed that SDGs must be 
universal and applicable to all countries. Similar to the Rio+20 outcome, this means that 
they must be flexible enough to have ownership of countries at different levels of develop-
ment and with different national priorities. However, the term “CBDR” was avoided. Two 
options were discussed about how to address differentiation within the SDGs: 
(i) Common set of goals coupled with the adoption of differentiated targets and/or time-
lines calibrated to level of development and national circumstances;  
(ii) Common set of goals with multiple targets and indicators under each (a dashboard 
or menu) from which countries themselves could prioritise when devising their own 
development agenda, in keeping with their level of development and national cir-
cumstances. 
In September 2013 at the Special Event on the MDGs, the General Assembly decided to 
pave the way for merging the two processes. Originally, the purpose of the event was to 
review the MDGs and decide how to shape a new development agenda after 2015, when 
the MDGs will expire. However, the outcome document of the Special Event provides 
countries with a short break and states that the intergovernmental negotiations on the post-
2015 agenda will only start in September 2014, when the OWG on the SDGs will have 
completed its task. Until then, further events under the auspices of the General Assembly 
will take place to set the stage for post-2015 in order to keep the process going by not an-
ticipating any outcomes (Rippin 2013). 
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Merging these two processes implies that sustainable development and poverty eradication 
will become overarching goals of the new post-2015 agenda. CBDR played a crucial role 
in the negotiations on the draft of the outcome document of the Special Event. Developing 
countries pushed for an inclusion of the term CBDR, whereas industrialised countries did 
not consider it to be very helpful or necessary to explicitly mention CBDR. Finally, the 
following phrase was adopted in the outcome document: “We reaffirm all the principles of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, including, inter alia, the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities, as set out in principle 7 thereof” (Outcome 
document, Special Event 2013; see also Rippin 2013). This shows that CBDR will contin-
ue to be an issue in the further development of the post-2015 agenda, although it remains 
to be seen how the principle of CBDR will be interpreted and applied in this context. 
5 Conclusion 
After decades of increasing international cooperation on environmental issues, the notion 
of common but differentiated responsibilities evolved into a cardinal principle in the con-
text of international negotiations under the UNFCCC. More specifically, common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities emerged as a policy principle that 
reflects the more philosophical principle of equity. It reflects the lasting political consen-
sus that the widest possible cooperation by all countries is needed to combat climate 
change and the adverse impacts thereof, and that all parties have a responsibility to act 
accordingly, while taking into account their different national circumstances, capacities, 
historical GHG emissions and development needs. 
The idea behind CBDR facilitated the creation of an international climate regime in the 
1990s, but the exact meaning of CBDR, let alone its implementation, remain complicated 
and, indeed, contentious. As demonstrated in section 3.3 of this paper, parties generally 
agree to the principle of CBDR-RC, but employ different conceptualisations when putting 
it into practice. The deadlock in international climate negotiations can be attributed at least 
partially to these divergent interpretations of CBDR. The multiplication of state groups 
and country coalitions and the rise of emerging economies has raised the stakes regarding 
the interpretation and, ultimately, the practical implementation of CBDR. In any case, it 
becomes clear that the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy is neither a practical nor a realis-
tic way forward. Not only the industrialised countries, but also the newly industrialising 
and developing countries will have to clearly limit the amount of greenhouse gases they 
emit in order to prevent dangerous climate change. While there is encouraging evidence 
for increased climate action on domestic levels – including from the biggest emitters 
among developing countries – this does not offset the need for a strong international cli-
mate agreement under the UNFCCC. 
In the search for ways to implement CBDR under a 2015 climate agreement, this discus-
sion paper analysed types of mechanisms that reflect the notion of CBDR in other interna-
tional regimes and negotiation processes. It thus addresses various manifestations of the 
principle under the CBD, the UNCCD, the WTO, the Montreal Protocol and bunker fuel 
emission control in shipping as well as with regard to the framing of the prospective 
SDGs. All these manifestations vary in context and scope. Hence, success factors from 
one agreement are not necessarily applicable or successful in another agreement. Still, the 
UNFCCC can learn from its historical and institutional antecedents. With this in mind, this 
Different perspectives on differentiated responsibilities 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 51 
conclusion provides three tables that are grounded on the context and scope of the UN-
FCCC, yet enriched with mechanisms from other empirical manifestations that could 
prove useful to develop scenarios for CBDR adoption and implementation as the UN-
FCCC evolves further (see Tables 18–20). These structure the main conclusions of the 
paper according to three categories: approach, differentiation and participation mecha-
nisms, as outlined below. 
Approach 
In the context of climate change mitigation, the “approach” basically means the attribution 
of GHG emissions. Under the UNFCCC regime, emissions are attributed to their source 
and respective producers, and the emission limitation and reduction targets are based on 
inter-state negotiations. The mechanism of “contraction and convergence” would be one 
approach that also fits within this line of attribution (see Table 1). Researchers point at a 
variety of possibilities, but it is politically unlikely that the attribution to states will be 
changed in an attribution to, for example, consumers or producers. Still, these approaches 
provide food for thought and are often referred to in public policy debates on international 
climate negotiations. 
Table 18: Approaches towards the attribution of GHG emissions 
Mechanism* Explanation 
Attribute emissions  
to consumers, not  
producers 
It is customary to attribute emissions to the source. However, it may make 
sense to attribute emissions to consumers. For instance, a large proportion of 
China’s emissions relate to the production of goods that are imported by and 
consumed in OECD countries. There is, however, no political experience with 
this approach (e.g. examples 1, 2 and 4); and it is also not considered in the 
bunker fuel emission control scenarios for shipping (example 5). 
Responsible actor Which actor should be held responsible: states, businesses or individual citi-
zens? States, as such, are not emitters of greenhouse gases, but they may have 
the power to regulate emissions and have taken on international legal obliga-
tions to do so. Holding businesses or even individuals responsible might prove 
much more complicated, although IMO is designing a revenue scheme that 
could work through ships or companies (example 5). 
Budget approach  Rather than calculating reduction obligations based on current levels of emis-
sions, the “emission rights” approach looks at how much GHG can still be 
emitted before global warming probably exceeds 2°C. Each country would then 
be allotted a national emissions budget. Existing proposals from India and the 
WBGU include tradable rights, which makes the budget approach more flexi-
ble and target-based than earlier proposals. Although there is some experience 
with caps (limiting emissions, such as the EU ETS and potentially example 5), 
there is no experience with approaches that include limited “budgets”; cf. ex-
amples 1, 2 and 4 do not include “budgets”.  
* Mechanisms and explanations are collected from the tables in chapters 3 and 4 and the references mentioned therein. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Differentiation 
The attribution of emissions is the foundation on which responsibilities to limit and reduce 
emissions can be based. This section lists options for differentiation of responsibilities 
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among countries based on criteria and means. First, the “criteria” reflect fundamental deci-
sions that need to be made on the basis of how and which differentiation will be organised 
over time. Second, the “means” reflect a number of practical ways in which differentiation 
can be made more acceptable for both countries with high and low early-phase commit-
ments (see also Table 19). 
One overarching theme in the debates about both the “criteria” and the “means” is 
flexibility over time. The Rio Convention states that “developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustaina-
ble development”, which is fundamentally different from the UNFCCC statement that 
“developed country Parties should take the lead.” The latter implies that others will 
(eventually) follow. It indicates a flexibility that is, however, not witnessed in the 
Kyoto Protocol, where even the second commitment period that was agreed upon in 
Doha in 2012 continues along the dichotomous pathway of Annex I versus Non-Annex 
I. Other international agreements such as the WTO’s GATT and the Montreal Protocol 
feature “graduation” mechanisms, in which countries acquire different responsibilities 
after a certain grace period or after reaching a threshold value in per capita income. 
Additionally, the Montreal Protocol also has an exclusion criteria: developing coun-
tries only have special rights (e.g. grace period, financial support) if their emissions 
stay below a specified threshold. Yet the UNFCCC currently treats the 150+ Non-
Annex I parties as one group and neither provides for further differentiation, nor does 
it set a timeframe for the re-evaluation of stronger developing-country obligations. In 
line with a host of pertinent studies (e.g. Parikh / Baruah 2012; Karousakis / Guay / 
Philibert 2008; Depledge / Yamin 2009), and in order to allow for more flexibility to-
wards the changing global economic and development outlook, the authors of this dis-
cussion paper conclude that it would be sensible to introduce: 
1) a further differentiation of state groups beyond the current dichotomous Annex I / Non-
Annex I dichotomy. Yet the introduction of additional groups will need to carefully re-
consider which number of groups would yield the most effective climate regime; 
2) graduation and exclusion mechanisms in order to accommodate for more flexibility. 
These again need to be based on clear and adequate criteria. For instance, a party 
would automatically graduate to a group with more responsibility to mitigate climate 
change once it reaches a certain state of economic development. Likewise, a party 
would be automatically excluded from one group if its (per capita) emissions or ener-
gy intensity grow above a certain threshold. 
The initial grouping and graduation (or relapse) from one group to another should be 
based on a basket of criteria. To adequately reflect the dynamics of climate change and 
global development, such a basket of criteria should take future emission growth paths 
of emerging economies into account to somewhat ameliorate Northern reluctance to-
wards CBDR under the climate regime (Honkonen 2009). At the same time, taking 
historical responsibility into account will reduce the reluctance of Southern countries. 
The combination of a corresponding basket of criteria and the possibility to graduate 
and exclude should produce a measure of flexibility that leaves parties with few excus-
es to enduringly refuse participation. 
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Table 19: Criteria and means to allow for differentiation of responsibilities under the UNFCCC 
 Mechanism* Explanation 
D
ef
in
e 
cr
ite
ria
 fo
r d
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
of
 re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
More country 
categories,  
include  
graduation  
The Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy could be replaced by a more  
comprehensive and larger number of groups, including provisions that 
allow for graduation from one category to another. The WTO (example 3) 
and CBD (example 1) already include several country categories. Alterna-
tively, the Montreal Protocol only includes developed and developing 
countries, but countries under the latter category only have special rights 
(e.g. grace period, financial support) if their emissions are below a certain 
threshold (making them “Article 5, paragraph 1 parties”). A correspond-
ing threshold could also be developed under the UNFCCC. 
More country 
categories,  
include exclusion 
The Montreal Protocol (example 4) has an exclusion criteria: developing  
countries only have special rights (e.g. grace period, financial support) if 
their emissions are below a certain threshold. Exclusion criteria could en-
hance graduation criteria in designing a flexible regime of multiple groups. 
Include criteria 
other than  
economic  
development and 
emissions 
Apart from economic development and current and future emissions, other 
elements could be considered in setting the differentiated mitigation  
obligations (with or without inclusion of historical responsibility):  
• mitigation potential 
• costs of mitigation 
• emissions per unit of GDP 
Indicator  
basket 
A basket of indicators necessary to reflect CBDR (e.g. Honkonen 2009; 
Karousakis / Guay / Philibert 2008; CAN 2013b). Based on the conven-
tion’s core equity principles, CAN proposes: adequacy, responsibility, ca-
pability, adaptation need and development need. Each of these would be 
measured with a chosen (set of) indicator(s). 
Sectoral-based 
differentiation 
Sectoral approaches can determine politically acceptable national targets 
and domestic allowance allocations based on reduction potentials from 
technological perspectives, including in developing countries. In the EU, for 
instance, this approach shifted the attention from comparing contributions 
and fairness among member states towards comparing contributions and 
fairness across sectors  
No voluntary 
undertakings vs. 
mandatory  
commitments 
In the Montreal Protocol, there was no distinction between some  
countries’ undertakings being voluntary and others having mandatory 
commitments. This has minimised the tensions between developing and 
developed countries. 
Same  
obligations,  
differentiated 
stringency or 
commitments 
All countries would be submitted to the responsibility to limit or reduce 
GHG emissions, with some having more stringent obligations than others. 
Obligations could be adopted with different types of commitments, with 
some countries taking on QELROs, and others adopting renewable en-
ergy targets or energy-efficiency targets. In its preparations for the 
ADP, the EU also considers differentiated commitments, such as  
intensity targets (emissions per unit of GDP or per capita) and deviation 
from BAU emissions.  
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Table 19 (cont.): Criteria and means to allow for differentiation of responsibilities under  
 the UNFCCC 
 Mechanism* Explanation 
D
ef
in
e 
m
ea
ns
 th
at
 a
llo
w
 fo
r d
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n 
Different base 
years 
Countries can start off with different base years (or over an average of  
several years), as was also done in the Montreal Protocol.  
Slower  
phasing-in 
Developing countries or groups of developing countries would be allowed a 
slower phasing-in of regulation than others, for example in terms of targets 
and timeframes. The duration of this means of differentiation is a main 
issue. A condition for a grace period could include a threshold of (per  
capita) consumption / production of a certain controlled substance, as was 
the case in the Montreal Protocol. 
Differentiate 
luxury emissions 
from survival 
emissions 
The poorest countries could be given “survival emissions” that are excluded 
from mitigation regulation or priced differently than “luxury emissions” 
associated with the lifestyles of affluent people. A distinction between what 
is luxury and what is not would inevitably be controversial, but the  
agreement on “critical use exemptions” under the Montreal Protocol  
provides a useful point of reference. 
* Mechanisms and explanations are collected from the tables in chapters 3 and 4 and the references mentioned therein. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
Participation mechanisms 
Finally, participation mechanisms concern incentives for parties to actually participate in a 
prospective 2015 climate agreement. This discussion paper reconfirms that compliance 
assistance of some description can be found in each and every one of the analysed agree-
ments and that it has proved essential in bringing developing countries on board. The most 
obvious means in this respect are technology transfer and (conditional) financial support, 
which has been demonstrated in examples 1, 2, 4 and 5 in section 4. In this light, public 
adaptation finance may also be considered as a participation mechanism. Indeed, adapta-
tion finance from Annex I countries is supposed to “be prioritized for the most vulnerable 
developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island developing States 
and Africa” (UNFCCC 2010, dec. 2/CP.15). This is a step of differentiation that goes be-
yond the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy, and beyond CBDR(RC), as discussed with 
regards to mitigation only. 
The mechanisms under the WTO also include technological assistance and “aid for trade”. 
Other proven and tested participation mechanisms include critical use exemptions, infor-
mation exchange, research promotion and capacity-building (see Table 20). 
Both the differentiation and the participation mechanisms require information up front in 
order to ensure transparency, quantifiability, comparability and verifiability. All of this 
will enable parties to better monitor their compliance with respective GHG emission limi-
tation and reduction targets. This in turn should also help to raise national as well as global 
ambitions in a manner that can be commensurate to keeping global warming below 2°C.  
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Table 20: Participation mechanisms 
Mechanism* Explanation 
Financial compensation All countries would have similar responsibilities towards 
mitigation, but developing countries would be entitled to 
financial compensation for environmental restraint while 
pursuing their humanitarian and development goals. 
Technology transfer All countries would have similar responsibilities towards 
mitigation, but developing countries would be entitled to 
technology transfer. Privileged market access, as men-
tioned under example 3, could contribute to technology 
transfer. 
Critical use exemptions This participation mechanism could be used for particular 
countries and for shipping of e.g. food or medicine under 
the IMO MBM proposals. It might apply for certain types 
of emission reductions, too. 
Joint fulfilment of commitments Allowing parties for joint fulfilment of commitments 
could enable aggregate calculated levels of greenhouse 
gas reductions to surpass the agreed levels, while reducing 
the burden for some of the countries involved. It could 
help a country to accept a higher emission limitation or 
reduction target, as it is partly forwarded to the group that 
takes on the joint fulfilment, rather than the country itself. 
Information exchange, research promotion,  
capacity-building 
Although these mechanisms are different, all three of 
them can stimulate compliance if they help developing 
countries to participate more actively in climate change 
mitigation. 
* Mechanisms and explanations are collected from the tables in chapters 3 and 4 and the references mentioned therein. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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